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I. JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to at least Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2a(3)(2). 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Issues 
1. Is this Complaint/Cause of action subject to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and the common law exception for equitable 
relief? (i.e., Whether Rameyfs Requests for Injunctive Relief and Complaint 
is Subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.) 
2. Did the trial court err by denying Rameyfs requested Temporary 
Restraining Order, as Ramey was a bona fide purchaser and was 
experiencing harm? (i.e., Whether the trial court properly denied RameyTs 
injunctive relief.) 
3. Did the trial court err by not addressing Rameyfs pending 
requests for injunctive relief? (i.e., Whether the Trial court Committed Error in not 
Addressing Ramey's pending Requests for Injunctive Relief.) 
4. Did the trial court err in denying Ramey's Request for Relief 
Under Rule 59 and 60? (i.e., Whether the Trial court Improperly Denied 
Ramey's Request for Relief Under Rule 59 and 60.) 
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5. Did the trial court err in granting Appellant Salt Lake City 
Corporation's Motion to Dismiss? {i.e., Whether the Trial court Improperly 
Granted Appellants Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion to Dismiss.) 
Ill STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND CONTROLLING 
AUTHORITY 
The issue of whether this Complaint/Cause of action is subject to the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the common law exception for 
injunctive relief is a question law. Specifically, it is a question of common 
law interpretation which the appellate court is well suited to address, and 
gives no deference to the lower court. See Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 
778-79 (Utah 1992); State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (ff[W]e consider the trial court's interpretation of binding case law as 
presenting a question of law and review the trial court's interpretation of that 
law for correctness."). 
Upon information and belief, a trial court's interpretation of statutes, 
rules and ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Tavlor ex 
rel C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); Loporto v. 
Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial 
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code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 
518, 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (contractor licensing). 
The issue of whether the trial court erred by denying Ramey's 
requested Temporary Restraining Order is, upon information and belief, 
abuse of discretion. See Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 
412 (Utah 1998); Miller v. Martineau & Co., 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Whether the Trial court Committed Error in not Addressing Ramey's 
pending Requests for Injunctive Relief is, upon information and belief, 
reviewed under correctness of law. See S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 
(Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999). This standard of review has also been referred to as a 
"correction of error standard." Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 
P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992); Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 
1992); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). As used by Utah's appellate courts, "correctness" means that no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. 
See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869 
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P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Racklev v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 970 P.2d 
277, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
The issue of whether the Trial court erred in denying Ramey's Request 
for Relief Under Rule 59 and 60 is, upon information and belief, reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. Supporting authority includes: See Child v. 
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 
(Utah 1994) ("At the extreme end of the discretion spectrum would be a 
decision by the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on insufficiency 
of the evidence."); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 
1993); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 
518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). See Butters v. Jackson, 917 P.2d 87, 88 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
However, as the refusal to grant a new trial was also from an 
application of the law, upon information and belief, the appropriate standard 
is a correctness standard. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1993); see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993); 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
The issue of whether the Trial court Improperly Granted Appellant 
Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion to Dismiss is, upon information and 
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belief, is correction of error. See Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 
1990). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Proceedings Below 
This appeal is taken from the Trial court's error in denying William P. 
Ramey Ill's ("Ramey") Temporary Restraining Order and the error in 
dismissing Ramey's remaining requests for injunctive relief/equitable relief 
and remaining causes of action. 
1. The Three Main Points of the Case Below 
The three main contentions that led Ramey to file the underlying 
action from which this Appeal is taken are: (Exhibit F to Docketing 
Statement, Affidavit of TRO, 13) 
i. Ramey was and is a bona fide purchaser for value for certain 
real property located at 38 South 1000 East, salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(hereinafter referred to as the ?,SLC property")). 
ii. Ramey acted in reliance on Salt Lake City Corporation's 
(hereinafter referred to as "the SLC Corp") approved Final Inspection 
Permits for certain repairs and construction performed on the SLC Property 
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and the absence of recorded non-compliance issues at the Recorder of 
Deeds. 
iii. Ramey acted in reliance on the Special Exception issued by the 
SLC Corp in the summer of 2006 approving the previously inspected and 
approved repairs and construction. 
B. Background 
1. Purchase of the SLC Property 
On or about August 10, 2005 Plaintiff Ramey purchased certain real 
property at 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 (hereinafter 
referred to as "SLC Property") for $575,000.00 dollars. There were no 
Certificates of Non-compliance recorded against the property. (See 
Affidavit of William P. Ramey, III accompanying the Request for a 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, j^ 4.)(hereinafter 
referred to as Affidavit) 
The SLC Property had undergone several years of restoration 
including all electrical, plumbing and support structures. As such, there was 
a tremendous amount of contractor work service performed at the SLC 
Property. (Affidavit, ^ 5) 
Many of these contract work services performed at the SLC Property 
required special permitting and inspection procedures by the Appellee SLC 
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Corp that results in an ultimate Final Inspection report whereby the SLC 
Corp approves the contractor work services. (Affidavit, j^ 6) Appellee SLC 
Corp performed several Mechanical inspections as to the placement of this 
A/C Unit that ultimately resulted in Permit No. 199163, Final Inspection, 
dated March 4, 2005, approved by, upon information and belief, Buck, #24. 
A true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A of the Affidavit. 
(See Affidavit, f^ 8 and Exhibit A) This final approval was the approval by 
the SLC Corp of the placement of the A/C Unit. (Affidavit, ^ 8, Exhibit A) 
2. Granted permits were relied upon in the purchase of the 
SLC Property 
Ramey purchased the SLC Property in reliance upon the various 
permits issued by the SLC Corp, especially the Final Approval of permit 
199163. (Affidavit, f^ 9) 
In or about April of 2006, Ramey became aware that the SLC Corp 
had filed a Certificate of Non-compliance against the SLC Property. The 
alleged Non-compliance was the placement of the A/C Unit within four (4) 
feet of the property line. Ramey contacted the SLC Corp's Planning and 
Zoning division and was ultimately directed to Kevin LoPiccolo, Zoning 
Administrator (hereinafter referred to as "LoPiccolo"). LoPiccolo informed 
Ramey that the Final Approval had been granted improperly. Ramey 
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informed LoPiccolo that he had purchased the property in reliance upon the 
permits issued by his office of the SLC Corp. Ramey informed LoPiccolo 
that he felt he was a bona fide purchaser for value. (Affidavit, f 11) Ramey 
and LoPiccolo spoke several more times over the next few weeks. In fact, 
Ramey supplied the SLC Corp with copies of various final approvals that 
had been lost by the SLC Corp. (Affidavit, f^ 12) On information and belief, 
the approvals were never lost by the SLC Corp, but thrown out. 
3. Ramey filed and was granted a Special Exception by the 
SLC Corp. 
LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the only option for Ramey to keep 
the A/C Unit in its location was to file a Special Exception Request. 
(Affidavit, | 13). The Special Exception allows the SLC Corp and/or the 
Community to approve a building project. Ramey protested being required 
to seek approval for that which was already approved. The SLC Corp has a 
procedure in place for inspecting and approving building projects that was 
followed. Ramey purchased the property in reliance on that procedure and 
the SLC Corp should not be allowed to change its mind at a later date. To 
allow the SLC Corp to make such changes removes all certainty in the 
approval and inspection process. (Affidavit, f^ 14) 
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However, Ramey did prepare the Special Exception request in an 
attempt to comply with the SLC Corp. The Special Exception Request is a 
long process whereby an Applicant provides a planned improvement, wit all 
of the specification drawings, the $200 fee, the cost for the mailing, and the 
address labels. Putting the documents together required about 20 hours 
worth of work and $204. A true and correct copy of Ramey's Special 
Exception Request is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit. The Special 
Exception Request was a complete document and accepted by the SLC Corp 
for review. (Affidavit, ^ 16) 
Ramey contacted LoPiccolo on numerous occasions concerning the 
Special Exception Request. (Affidavit, f^ 17) On or about June 19, 2006, the 
SLC Corp granted the Special Exception request. (Affidavit, If 18) Ramey 
was told by Piccolo that the granting of the Special Exception Request was 
at least in part because the A/C Unit was a pre-existing condition at the time 
Ramey purchased the property and because of other adjacent properties to 
the SLC Property likewise had A/C Units placed in comparable proximity to 
the property line, namely the property at 42 South 1000 East. Shortly 
thereafter, the Special Exception was recorded at the County Recorder's 
Office. (Affidavit, If 19) 
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4. Ramey moved to Texas and the SLC Corp filed another 
Notice of Noncompliance 
Ramey then moved to Houston, Texas in August of 2006. However, 
Ramey still owned the SLC Property and had put it on the market. 
(Affidavit, K 20) On or about November 16, 2006, LoPiccolo contacted 
Ramey's agent and stated that the placement of the A/C Unit was not in 
compliance. In response, Ramey immediately contacted LoPiccolo, as they 
had talked before. LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the SLC Corp was going 
to issue another Notice of noncompliance against the SLC Property for the 
placement of the A/C Unit. Ramey questioned LoPiccolo as to how that was 
possible in light of the two previous approvals and the fact that Ramey was a 
bona fide purchaser of the pre-exiting condition. LoPiccolo informed him 
that the SLC Corp was requiring the action and there was nothing he could 
do. (Affidavit, Tj 21) Ramey's agent questioned whether the SLC property 
could be sold as it is presently permitted. (Affidavit, 1J22).. Further, 
LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the SLC Corp has told Ramey's neighbor 
that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance. (Affidavit, }^23) 
5. Ramey Filed a Request for a TRO and accompanying 
Complaint 
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Thereafter, in December of 2006, Ramey filed a Request for a 
Temporary Restraining Order (hereinafter referred to as "TRO") and 
Request for a Preliminary Injunction. 
In a Complaint filed concurrently (hereinafter referred to as 
"Complaint"), Ramey further complained that the SLC Corp's action, 
by and through Kevin LoPiccolo and others acted to dissuade 
purchasers, acted to cause potential purchasers to look elsewhere, and 
acted to prevent Ramey from selling the property at market value. 
(See Complaint, fs 1 -46). 
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp has a duty to the 
property owners of Salt Lake City to honor its previously issued permits and 
Special Exceptions. At a minimum, it would be expected that the SLC Corp 
would honor its issued permits as to a bona fide purchaser or a purchaser of 
a pre-existing condition. (See Complaint, f^s 1-63). 
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp has a duty to the 
property owners of Salt Lake City to not falsely make accusations. At a 
minimum, it would be expected that the SLC Corp would not contact people 
to falsely state that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance. The SLC 
Corp has contacted Ramey's agent and stated that the SLC Property was not 
legally in compliance. The SLC Corp has contacted Ramey's neighbor and 
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stated that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance. Ramey has been 
damaged by these false statements by the SLC Corp at least to the appraised 
value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance. All of the 
permits and a Special Exception have been issued by the SLC Corp. (See 
Complaint, Tfs 1-86). 
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp has a duty to treat all 
subject properties in a particular zoning area the same. The standard of care 
would be that the rules should be enforced the same throughout a particular 
zoning area. The SLC property is in zone R-2. The SLC Corp has not 
treated all property owners within Ramey's zone the same or similar. 
Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South 1000 East, has a similar A/C Unit that should 
be treated like Ramey's A/C Unit. (See Complaint, f s 1-91). 
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp's action issuing a 
Certificate of Non-compliance and/or issuing a Certificate of Non-
compliance for the previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163 
and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit is being perpetuated 
falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value 
and the A/C Unit has been approved twice. The SLC Corp is bullying 
Ramey by preventing him from transferring title of the SLC Property. 
Ramey will continue to be harmed by this false perpetuation and Appellee 
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SLC Corp's wrongful conduct at least to the appraised value of the property 
without the Certificate of Non-compliance. (See Complaint, f^s 1-91). 
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp's action of recording a 
Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved Final Inspection 
of Permit 199163 and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit is 
being perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide 
purchaser for value and the A/C Unit has been approved twice. (See 
Complaint, fs 1-91). 
Likewise, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp's action of recording 
a Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved Final 
Inspection of Permit 199163 was perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. 
Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was approved. 
Ramey was harmed by this false perpetuation and Appellee SLC Corp's 
wrongful conduct. As the direct and proximate result of Appellee SLC 
Corp's wrongful conduct, Appellee has unlawfully profited and Ramey has 
suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm. (See Complaint, |^s 1-
91). 
Further, Ramey complained that the SLC Corp's action of recording a 
Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved Final Inspection 
of Permit 199163 was perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is 
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a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was approved. The SLC 
Corp is bullying Ramey by preventing him from transferring title of the SLC 
Property. (See Complaint, Ifs 1-91). 
Further, Ramey complained that Ramey is being treated differently 
than even his neighbor who has a similar A/C Unit. Upon information and 
belief, Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South 1000 East, has not been harassed or 
even contacted concerning the A/C Unit on that property. (See Complaint, 
Ifs 1-91). 
Further, Ramey complained that the Appellee SLC Corp, by and 
through LoPiccolo, made a false statement to Ramey's neighbor and real 
estate agent that the property was out of compliance. The SLC Corp knew 
that all of the permits had been approved and that a Special Exception had 
been granted. The SLC Corp's actions damaged Ramey by destroying the 
alienability of the SLC Property. (See Complaint, f^s 1-91). 
Further, Ramey complained that the Appellee SLC Corp, by and 
through LoPiccolo and, upon information and belief, other SLC Corp 
employees, has spread the word that the SLC property is not in compliance, 
a false statement. The SLC Corp knew that all of the permits had been 
approved and that a Special Exception had been granted. The SLC Corp's 
14 
actions damaged Ramey by destroying the alienability of the SLC Property. 
(See Complaint, 1fs 1-91). 
6. The TRO was denied 
The TRO was denied on or about December 15, 2005. As a result: 
(1) Ramey suffered irreparable harm because the order or injunction 
did not issue and Ramey was not able to sell the property because of the 
Recorded Notice of Non-compliance; 
(2) The injury to Ramey outweighed any alleged damage that the SLC 
Corp might have experienced, as the damage is quantifiable; 
(3) The injunction would have served the public interest in that it 
would have at least restored certainty to the process; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that Ramey would have and will 
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim because Ramey has a validly 
issued permit and a granted Special Exception. 
In fact, the SLC Corp admitted such in the Motion Hearing Transcript 
from March 12, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as "Hearing Transcript" 1), 
transcribed and reported back to the Third Trial court on or about August 15, 
l A copy of this hearing transcript was not received by Appellant until late 
August 2007. Appellant has concurrently filed a supplemental docketing 
statement with this Appeal Brief adding the transcript of the March 12, 2007 
Motion Hearing to the record on appeal. 
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2007 and attached in the Appendix of this Appellate Brief. On page 6, line 
19, Ms Furse, representing the SLC Corp, stated that 
For instance, if he were to appeal to the Third District and get a 
decision that Salt Lake City erred, then he can do one of two 
things. Either he can e content, get his decision and not have a 
problem or he can claim, "Okay, because of the error that was 
made, as recognized by the Third Trial court, now Tm entitled 
to damages. 
(Exhibit A to the Appendix, lines 19-24). Accordingly, the SLC Corp 
admitted that if it is shown that the SLC Corp erred in the handling of the 
SLC Property then Ramey was damaged. 
After denying Ramey's TRO, the Trial court allowed the SLC Corp an 
extension of time to answer, effectively staying the action. The SLC Corp's 
new answer date was extended to about January 12, 2007. (See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief Under Rule 59 and 60 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("Motion Under Rule 59 or 60"), 1}17). 
On or about January 17, 2007, Ramey did file a Notice and Request 
for Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Injunctive relief on or about January 
12, 2007. This Court never ruled on Plaintiffs injunctive relief. (See 
Clerk's Docket, p. 2). 
7. The SLC Corp filed a Motion to Dismiss 
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Rather than answer, the SLC Corp filed a Motion to Dismiss. The 
SLC Corp's Motion to Dismiss was at least in part predicated upon Ramey' 
s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and Ramey' s alleged 
failure to give sixty days Notice to the SLC Corp prior to filing suit. (See 
Motion Under Rule 59 or 60, ^ 18). 
Ramey did file a Notice and Request for Decision on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Injunctive relief on or about January 12, 2007. The Trial court 
never ruled on Plaintiffs injunctive relief. (See Motion Under Rule 59 or 
60, ^fl9). This period of time was while the Court ordered stay was in effect. 
Ultimately, after briefing and a Motion Hearing, on or about March 
12, 2007, the Trial court granted the SLC Corp's motion to dismiss in a 
Minute Entry issued March 14, 2007. (See Minute Entry of March 14, 
2007). 
At the Motion Hearing, the SLC Corp argued that Ramey's Complaint 
is about seeking damages from the SLC Corp. (See Appendix, Hearing 
Transcript, p. 4, 1. 9 to p. 7, 1. 8). Ramey's Complaint and request for 
injunctive relief has always been about the fact that 
1. Ramey was a Bona Fide Purchaser for Value; 
2. Ramey Acted in Reliance on SLC Corp Permits in 
Purchasing the SLC Property; and, 
17 
3. Ramey asserts that he is a bona fide purchaser for value 
relying on the permits issued by the City in the purchase 
of the SLC Property. (See Motion Under Rule 59 or 60, 
1js6-2l). 
Ramey sought the injunctive relief to stop the SLC Corp from its abuse of 
the process and return certainty to that process. The SLC Corp cannot recast 
Ramey's cause of action. 
At the Motion Hearing, Ramey handed the Court copies of controlling 
case law from the Utah Supreme Court, Jenkins v. Swan 675 P.2d 1145, 
1153 (Utah 1983) (included in the Addendum, item #2), which explains the 
common law exception to governmental immunity for equitable claims. 
(See Appendix, Hearing Transcript, p. 11,1. 21 to p. 12,1. 19). 
All permits indicated that the SLC property at 38 South 1000 East, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 was in compliance. All inspections were Final. 
No Notices of Non-compliance were recorded against the SLC property at 
the time of Ramey's closing on the SLC Property. (See Motion Under Rule 
59 or 60, Tfs 6-21). 
Ramey's mortgage company searched the records at the time of 
closing and also did not locate any Notice of Non-compliance. The SLC 
Corp filed a first Notice of Non-compliance after Ramey had purchased and 
18 
recorded his interest in the property. Ramey's purchase was partial cash and 
a mortgage. The A/C Unit was therefore a pre-existing condition. Ramey 
purchased the SLC Property in reliance on the SLC Corp's Final Inspection 
permits. Ramey would not have purchased the property had the permits not 
been issued as Final and Approved. The SLC Corp should not be allowed to 
remove validly issued Final Inspection Permits after Ramey has relied on 
them in the purchase of the property. (See Motion Under Rule 59 or 60, j^s 
6-21). 
After becoming aware of a Non-compliance recorded against the SLC 
property, Ramey sought to have it removed by going the extraordinary 
expense of both time and resources to prepare a Special Exception request 
for a previously granted Final Inspection Permit. The SLC Corp's Planning 
and Zoning Division agreed with Ramey that the A/C Unit was a pre-
existing condition on the SLC Property at the time of Ramey's purchase and 
granted the Special Exception. When Ramey put his property on the market, 
the SLC Corp threatened to prevent Ramey from selling the property by 
recording a Notice of Non-compliance against the property. The SLC Corp 
should not be allowed to alter recorded records as it desires after a valid 
Special Exception has issued from its office. Returning to this 
memorandum, this Court denied Ramey's request for a temporary 
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restraining order and allowed the SLC Corp an extension of time to answer, 
effectively staying the action. The SLC Corp's new answer date was 
extended to about January 12, 2007. (See Motion Under Rule 59 or 60, f s 6-
21). 
Ultimately, the trial court granted the SLC Corp's motion to dismiss 
in an Order issued March 14, 2007. (See Memorandum Decision of March 
14, 2007). The Court appears to have held that "[wjhile Plaintiff contends 
he is not taking issue with the decision of the Zoning Administrator and only 
seeks equitable relief, he is, nonetheless, challenging the land use decision 
embodied in the Certificate of Noncompliance. As a result, Plaintiff must 
exhaust his administrative remedies. With respect to the Notice of Claim 
issue, the statute makes clear that the sixty days must be exhausted prior to 
the action being initiated." See (See Memorandum Decision of March 14, 
2007, p. 3). Ramey received the order on March 19, 2007 through regular 
US mail. The trial court never addressed Ramey's equitable relief. 
The trial court appears to have held that "Plaintiff contends he is not 
taking issue with the decision of the Zoning Administrator and only seeks 
equitable relief, he is, nonetheless, challenging the land use decision 
embodied in the Certificate of Noncompliance. As a result, Plaintiff must 
exhaust his administrative remedies. With respect to the Notice of Claim 
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issue, the statute makes clear that the sixty days must be exhausted prior to 
the action being initiated." (See Minute Entry of May 9, 2007). The Trial 
court never addressed the pending injunctive relief. 
8. Ramey files a Motion for relief under Rule 59 or 60 
Ramey then filed a Motion for relief under rule 59 and 60 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to reinstate Ramey' s dismissed action as required 
by long established Utah Supreme Court precedent, the Governmental 
Immunity Act does not apply to claims for equitable relief. The Motion was 
timely filed and the trial court did consider it. However, the trial court 
denied Ramey's requested relief. 
9. The Court issued a Final Order on May 15, 2007 
The Trial court entered a Final Order on or about May 15, 2007 
finally dismissing Rameyfs Causes of Action. Ramey never received a copy 
of this Order. In fact, Salt City Attorney Margaret Plane has also indicated 
that she has not received a copy. Ramey timely appealed from the trial 
court's order. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The underlying cause of action is subject to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and the common law exception for 
equitable relief 
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Reference to the first document filed in this case illustrates that this is 
an equitable action. The title of the Complaint is "Original Complaint and 
Request for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction." 
(See Complaint, title page). File concurrently with the requested equitable 
relief was a complaint complaining of various injuries and requesting 
damages, as is standard practice. Accordingly, equitable relief was 
requested and equitable relief is not subject to the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. This Court gives no deference to the lower court on a 
misinterpretation of the common law. See Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 
778-79 (Utah 1992); State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (n[W]e consider the trial court's interpretation of binding case law as 
presenting a question of law and review the trial court's interpretation of that 
law for correctness."). 
The SLC Corp has misled the trial court into thinking that the 
underlying action is an action for damages and an action complaining of a 
certificate of non-compliance. As Ramey was the underlying plaintiff, 
Ramey is the master of his own Complaint. As the Background of this 
Appeal stated, Ramey was seeking relief from the SLC Corp not following 
its own policies and procedures. (See Complaint, fs 6-16). 
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Ramey purchased a house with all permits approved. The SLC Corp 
later changed its mind, thereby affecting Ramey as a bona fide purchaser, 
and issued a Notice of Noncompliance. Ramey then filed for the Special 
Exception. That Special Exception was granted and recorded on the 
property. 
Then, only after Ramey moved to Texas, the SLC Corp issued and 
recorded another Notice of Noncompliance in November of 2006. The SLC 
Corp, without any authority and against public policy and its published 
procedures, issued another Certificate of Noncompliance for the exact issue 
that was approved through the Special Exception procedure. Accordingly, 
the SLC Corp has completely ignored its policies and procedures. It was the 
SLC Corp that originally permitted the A/C Unit. It then changed its mind 
after Ramey purchased the property. It was the SLC Corp that granted 
Ramey's Special Exception. It then changed its mind after Ramey moved to 
Texas and issued another Notice of Noncompliance. Accordingly, the SLC 
Corp has operated completely outside its statutory framework and its 
policies and procedures. Nowhere is authorization provided for what the 
SLC Corp did. 
The SLC Corp's actions damage the public. By its actions, the SLC 
Corp has removed all certainty from the process. If this Court allows its 
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Order to stand dismissing this action, the SLC Corp will be authorized to 
change its mind on any Special Exception that it has granted previously. 
There will no longer be any certainty in the process. This issue is larger than 
this one case. Here, the SLC Corp is being given implicit authorization to 
do as it wishes by this Court in dismissing this cause of action. Ramey's 
complaint is not about the Notice of Noncompliance. Ramey's complaint is 
about the broken policies and procedures at the SLC Corp. In fact, Ramey's 
complaint and the relief sought, injunctive relief, makes this very apparent. 
It is time to return certainty to the process. It is time to prevent the SLC 
Corp from changing the rules as it goes. Here, Ramey followed all policies 
and procedures. Here, the SLC Corp did not. 
The trial court was provided with the appropriate law at the Motion 
Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and in the briefing on the Motion for 
Relief under Rule 59 and 60. However, the trial court misinterpreted the 
common law. This Court gives no deference to the lower court on a 
misinterpretation of the common law. See Trujillo, 840 P.2d at 778-79; 
State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d at 518 (f,[W]e consider the trial court's 
interpretation of binding case law as presenting a question of law and review 
the trial court's interpretation of that law for correctness."). 
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The trial court, at least in part, dismissed Ramey's causes of action on 
its misinterpretation that Ramey failed to give proper Notice of Claim to the 
SLC Corp and that Ramey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
Ramey requests this Court to affirmatively state that Ramey has complied 
with the Notice requirement and that Ramey's is complaining of the broken 
policies and procedures of the SLC Corp. 
A trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 
977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 
21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing 
& Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
(contractor licensing). Here, the trial court/trial court was incorrect in its 
interpretation of the law and the underlying action should not have been 
dismissed as equitable relief was sought. Moreover, equitable relief was still 
pending and never considered by the trial court. 
Further, it has long been the law that the sixty (60) days Notice 
requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to 
requests for injunctive relief. See Jenkins 675 P.2d at 1153 citing El Rancho 
Enterprises 565 P.2d at 779. In the Jenkins case, the Utah Supreme Court 
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provided a good discussion on the rationale for the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Section 63-30-11. That portion of the act provides that "any 
person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity or against an 
employee shall before maintaining an action for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, shall file a written notice of claim with such entity." 
See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1153-1154. The Court then went on to discuss the 
meaning of the word "injury" within the Act. See Id at 1154. Injury is 
defined, in the Governmental Immunity Act as "death, injury to a person, 
damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to 
his person, or estate that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person 
or his agent." See id. In the Jenkins case, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that actions seeking equitable relief are not subject to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. See Id and El Rancho, 565 P.2d at 780. 
Accordingly, Ramey's Complaint is not subject to the Notice requirement. 
Therefore, there is no requirement to wait sixty (60) days after a Notice of 
Claim. 
However, even if this Court determines a Notice is due, a Notice was 
filed by Ramey. Further, the SLC Corp and Ramey were in constant 
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communication throughout 2006 as is illustrated by the Special Exception 
and Notices of Non-compliance. The SLC Corp did have Notice. 
Moreover, careful examination of the Jenkins case reveals that the 
Utah Supreme Court also allowed Jenkins' claims for damages of the tax 
paid in protest. See id at 779. Accordingly, Ramey's requests for damages 
should be allowed to continue as they were filed with the requests for 
injunctive relief. Therefore, Ramey requests this Court to Order 
reinstatement of Ramey's Complaint particularly specifying that proper 
Notice was given. 
Logically, the reinstatement of the damages with the equitable claims 
is appropriate. This well-established common law exception to the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not require the maintenance of two 
separate actions, as would be the effect if this Court did not reinstate the 
claims for damages and Ramey was required to file a separate action. 
B. The trial court erred by denying Rameyfs requested Temporary 
Restraining Order, as Ramey was a bona fide purchaser and was 
experiencing harm 
This Court will review the trial court's denial of Ramey's requested 
TRO for an abuse of discretion. See Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 
P.2d 411, 412 (Utah 1998); Miller v. Martineau & Co., 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 
34, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Under Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction 
may issue where the applicant demonstrates the following: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage 
the proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or 
enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the 
public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on 
the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues 
on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation. Utah 
R. of Civ. P. 65A(e). 
1. Ramey Did Suffer Irreparable Harm when the TRO did not 
issue 
The SLC Corp's acts of approving the construction through permit 
199163, then issuing a Notice of Noncompliance, then granting a Special 
Exception, then issuing another Notice of Noncompliance prevented Ramey 
from transferring title the SLC property, dissuaded buyers and lowered the 
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value of Ramey's property. Further, the SLC Corp damaged Ramey through 
at least tortious interference with contract and prospective contract, 
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, fraud, wrongful recordation, 
wrongful attachment, conversion, trespass to try title, trespass to real 
property, slander of title, and the like. 
As set forth in the record, the SLC Corp, by and through the Planning 
and Zoning Division, had granted approval of the placement of the A/C Unit 
through the normal permitting procedure under permit 199163, granted 
March 4, 1995. However, then the SLC Corp issued a Certificate of Non-
compliance against the SLC Property for the placement of the A/C Unit. 
Ramey had purchased the property before the Certificate of Non-
compliance was recorded, as such he is a bona fide purchaser for value and 
can rely on the issued permit 199163. However, the SLC Corp proceeded to 
file the Certificate of Non-compliance 
Ramey purchased the property on August 10, 1995 when there were 
no Certificates of Non-compliance recorded against the property. In August 
of 2006, Ramey relocated to Texas and placed the SLC Property on the 
market through an agency. To place the property on the MLS, Ramey had to 
sign an agreement with his agent. 
a. Interference with Contract: 
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In November of 2006, when the SLC Corp contacted Ramey's agent it 
committed an act of interference with contract in that the SLC Corp was 
attempting to cause the agent not to market the property in light of a non-
existent compliance issue. Such act is interfering with Ramey's 
representation agreement with the agent, interfering with his contract. Such 
actions are calculated by the SLC Corp to force Ramey to spend great sums 
of money for an issue that has been at least twice remedied under the SLC 
Corp's procedures. Such damage is a dollar amount at least to the appraised 
value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance. 
Likewise, the SLC Corp's action, by and through LoPiccolo and 
others did dissuade purchasers, acted to cause potential purchasers to look 
elsewhere, and acted to prevent Ramey from selling the property. 
b. Negligent Misrepresentation: 
The SLC Corp represented to Ramey that the A/C Unit was properly 
placed and approved. Ramey purchased the SLC Property in light of an 
issued permit, permit 199163, a Final Approval. Ramey relied, therefore, on 
the permit. Likewise, after the long, expensive, and time-consuming process 
of preparing and getting approved the Special Exception Request, Ramey 
should be able to rely upon its validity. Here, Ramey relied upon the 
granted Special Exception. 
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The SLC Corp has a duty to the property owners of Salt Lake City to 
honor its previously issued permits and Special Exceptions. Here, the SLC 
Corp did not honored its previously issued permit 199163. 
c. Negligence: 
The SLC Corp further has a duty to correctly represent the recorded 
records on a piece of property. At a minimum, it would be expected that the 
SLC Corp would not contact people to falsely state that the SLC Property is 
not legally in compliance. The SLC Corp did contact Ramey's agent and 
stated that the SLC Property was not legally in compliance. Further, the 
SLC Corp has contacted Ramey's neighbor and stated that the SLC Property 
is not legally in compliance even considering that the SLC Corp granted 
upon Final Inspection approval permit 199163 and even considering that the 
SLC Corp granted the Special Exception. 
d. Wrongful Recordation and Wrongful Attachment 
The SLC Corp's action of threatening to record a Certificate of Non-
compliance and/or recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for the 
previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved 
Special Exception for the A/C Unit is being perpetuated falsely without any 
legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit has 
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been approved twice. The SLC Corp's action of recording a Certificate of 
Non-compliance for the previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 
199163 was perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona 
fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was approved. 
e. Conversion/Trespass to Try Title/Trespass to Real 
Property: 
The SLC Corp's act recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for the 
previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved 
Special Exception for the A/C Unit is being perpetuated falsely without any 
legal basis. 
f. Suit to Quiet Title/Trespass to Real Property: 
The SLC Corp discriminated against Ramey in the sale of his property 
by recording an improper Certificate of Non-compliance and for threatening 
to file an improper Certificate of Non-compliance. Ramey is being treated 
differently than even his next door neighbor who has a similar A/C Unit. 
Upon information and belief, Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South 1000 East, has 
not been harassed or even contacted concerning the A/C Unit on that 
property. Ramey is being damaged by this disparate treatment in that the 
SLC Property cannot be sold because of the threats and actions from the 
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SLC Corp. Accordingly, the SLC Corp is damaging Ramey at least to the 
amount of his mortgage. 
g. Slander of Title: 
Defendant SLC Corp, by and through LoPiccolo, made a false 
statement to Ramey's neighbor and real estate agent that the property was 
out of compliance. The SLC Corp knew that all of the permits had been 
approved and that a Special Exception had been granted. The SLC Corp's 
actions damaged Ramey by destroying the alienability of Ramey's SLC 
property. 
Accordingly, Ramey is likely to be successful on all of his causes of 
action, as they all stem from the SLC Corp disregarding its previously issued 
permit 199163 and its previously granted Special Exception. These harms 
could only have been resolved by the issuance of injunctive relief, as merely 
awarding damages was not sufficient to remove all the confusion, to allow 
certainty to prevail, and to cause SLC Corp to honor its own actions. 
2. The Threatened Harm to Ramey Outweighed Any Damages 
That May Result to SLC Corp 
Ramey was irreparably harmed The SLC Corp prevented transfer of 
title and required Ramey to expend further resources on the SLC property. 
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The requested temporary restraining order is not outweighed by the potential 
damages to the Defendant, as the SLC Corp is not entitled to continue its 
unlawful behavior. Issuance of the temporary restraining order would have 
only barred the SLC Corp from falsely recording a Certificate of Non-
compliance against the SLC Property for the placement of the A/C Unit. 
The SLC Corp, as a governmental organization, will not be in any way 
harmed. 
3. Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order Would Not Be 
Adverse to Public Interest. 
Courts have long considered the public interest as a factor to be 
considered in granting injunctive relief. Here, the granting of the restraining 
order and injunction would have served the public interest in at least (1) 
returning certainty to the property records; (2) returning certainty to the 
special exception procedure; (3) returning certainty to the inspection 
process; (4) preventing Salt Lake City Corporation from continued 
harassment of Ramey, a property owner and former resident; (5) establishing 
that this type of act by the Salt Lake City Corporation is a prohibited act; 
and, (6) restoring alienability to Ramey's land. Accordingly, there are 
strong public policy reasons to grant this restraining order and injunction. 
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4. There Is a Substantial Likelihood That Ramey Will Prevail 
on the Merits of its Claim in the Instant Case. 
Under the present facts, as outlined above, there is a substantial 
likelihood that Ramey will prevail on the merits of his claims. Ramey has 
an issued Final Approval for the placement of the A/C Unit on the SLC 
Property that he relied on as a purchaser of the property. Accordingly, 
Ramey is a bona fide purchaser. Further, Ramey has a granted Special 
Exception for which he expended both economic resources and time. As 
well, public policy should dictate that the SLC Corp honor it's granted 
permits and granted special exceptions. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ramey's 
requested TRO. 
C. The trial court erred by not addressing Ramey's pending requests 
for injunctive relief. 
This Court will give no deference to the trial court in reviewing its 
decision to dismiss the action without addressing Ramey's pending 
injunctive relief. See S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1998); Orton 
v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing 
& Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
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Ramey had pending injunctive relief that was not addressed by the trial 
court. 
D. The trial court erred in denying Rameyfs Request for Relief 
Under Rule 59 and 60 
This Court will review the trial court's denial of Ramey's Request for 
Relief Under Rule 59 and 60 under an abuse of discretion standard. See 
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
938 (Utah 1994) ("At the extreme end of the discretion spectrum would be a 
decision by the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on insufficiency 
of the evidence."); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 
1993); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 
518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). See Butters v. Jackson, 917 P.2d 87, 88 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). Here, the trial court did abuse its discretion as it was 
given the correct law to follow and still dismissed the case and denied the 
request for relief under rule 59 and 60. 
A correctness standard will be used in the trial court's interpretation 
of the common law. Crookston, 860 P.2d at 938; see State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1270 n.l 1 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 
n.3 (Utah 1991). 
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E. The trial court erred in granting Appellant Salt Lake City 
Corporation's Motion to Dismiss 
The underlying action was an action for equitable relief and the trial 
court should not have dismissed the action as equitable relief is not subject 
to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1153 
citing El Rancho Enterprises, Inc., 565 P.2d at 779; and, Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Section 63-30-11. This Court will review the decision under 
the standard for a correction of error. See Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 
(Utah 1990). Here, it was error to dismiss Ramey's causes of action. 
VI. PRAYER AND CONCLUSION 
Ramey respectfully prays that this Court reinstate Ramey's Causes of 
Action by Reversing the Trial court's Order Dismissing all of Ramey's 
causes of Action. Further, Ramey respectfully requests that this Court order 
the Appellant to pay the costs for this appeal, a reasonable attorney's fee for 
this appeal, the costs for the Trial court action, and a reasonable attorney's 
fee for the Trial court action. Appellant further respectfully requests the 
ability to supplement issues for appeal once the Final Order Dismissing the 
action is received. 
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Respectfully Submitted, 
William P. Ramey, III 
38 South 1000 East 
Salt Lake ( % , Utahjjjjj 
2244 Welch St. 
Houston, TX 77019 
(713) 857-6005 (phone) 
(713) 429-4187 (fax) 
Pro Se 
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1. Transcript of March 12, 2007 Motion Hearing. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM P. RAMEY, III, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 060920071 PR 
MOTION HEARING 
March 12, 2007 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
District Court Judge 
|eri Kearbey 
Certified Court Transcriber 
iz-50 Gaylene Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
(801) chh-
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: Pro Se 
For the Defendant: Evelyn J. Furse 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
451 South State, #505A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, MARCH 12, 2007, 9:00 A.M. 
-oooOooo-
THE COURT: Matter before the Court is Ramey v. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 060920071. William P. Ramey 
appears pro se. Evelyn Furse — 
MS. FURSE: Yes. 
THE COURT: — on behalf of respondent. Also, 
Mr. Chandler. 
MR. CHANDLER: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
This is before the Court on Salt Lake City 
Corporation's motion to dismiss. That has been briefed. 
However, on March the 7th, Mr. Ramey filed a notice of the 
Board of Adjustment decision conclusively ending Ramey's 
administrative remedies. 
Ms. Furse, have you had opportunity to review 
this? 
MS. FURSE: Yes, I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to have an opportunity to 
reply to it? Does it — does it warrant a reply on your 
behalf, or can we go forward with the argument, or do you 
want opportunity to have a written reply and a response from 
Mr. Ramey? 
MS. FURSE: We can go forward today and I can 
address it in my oral argument today. 
3 
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. 
With that said, the Court appreciates courtesy 
copies of the motion, both memorandum in support, opposition 
and reply. This is the time for oral argument on Salt Lake 
City's motion. Ms. Furse, you have convenience of the 
record. 
MS. FURSE: Good morning, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
MS. FURSE: With respect to the Board of 
Adjustment decision which you just mentioned, that is not 
before this Court at this time because it is not in the 
initial complaint as — that — that's in dispute for the 
motion to dismiss here today. 
However, it doesn't exactly exhaust the 
administrative process as a point of procedure because, as 
noted in the — in the notice from the Board, the plaintiff 
has 30 days from the time he receives the final written 
decision to appeal that decision to the Third District 
Court, which is a separate appeal than what's occurring 
here. 
THE COURT: Okay. And, to be honest, you've lost 
me there. 
MS. FURSE: I figured I might have. 
THE COURT: But, I mean, I guess what I was trying 
to do is to get everybody on the same path so we can move 
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this in an orderly manner through the system. 
MS. FURSE: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And maybe my wishes will not come to 
fruition, because you indicate that there's two separate 
parallel paths of appeal? 
MS. FURSE: Well, it - actually, no. It's one 
parallel — it's one path — 
THE COURT: Path. 
MS. FURSE: - but this path got started too 
early is the problem. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. FURSE: The path is, you go from having 
whatever decision you might receive from the zoning 
administrator or from the — from whatever land use decision 
you might get, and you appeal that to the Board of 
Adjustment. From the Board of Adjustment, you are entitled 
to appeal their decision to the Third District Court. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. FURSE: But that is only the decision. You're 
not entitled to any damages from that appeal in any fashion. 
So you finish that appeal to the Third District Court. 
THE COURT: Now, is that the track we're on now? 
MS. FURSE: No. That's not the track we're on 
now. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MS. FURSE: That's the track that this Board of 
Adjustment decision is part of. And that's why I say it's 
not really pertinent to this matter. 
THE COURT: But the track that we're on now, your 
argument is, that he — it is premature again and he has 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 
MS. FURSE: Correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. FURSE: And the track Mr. Ramey's pursuing now 
is the track wherein he can get damages. And in order to 
start on the damage track, you have to exhaust the basic 
track of getting your final decision. And there's — and 
that track — he's farther along now than he was previously 
because he's gone to the Board of Adjustment. But he now 
needs to go from the Board of Adjustment to the Third 
District Court, which could be you, but it has to — and get 
that decision and then, depending on that decision, he may 
or may not be able to come back for damages. 
For instance, if he were to appeal to the Third 
District and get a decision that Salt Lake City erred, then 
he can do one of two things. Either he can be content, get 
his decision and not have a problem or he can claim, "Okay, 
because of the error that was made, as recognized by the 
Third District Court, now I'm entitled to damages." 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MS. FURSE: But none of that can be done until 
this final step of the appeal from the Board of Adjustment 
to the Third District Court is complete. 
THE COURT: So regardless of the path that we're 
taking, your argument in today's hearing is: In spite of 
the Board of Adjustment decision, in spite of the procedural 
history of my case, it is still premature in that he still 
has to exhaust remedies. 
MS. FURSE: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So the remedy you're asking for me to 
decide is to dismiss without prejudice — 
MS. FURSE: Correct. 
THE COURT: - allow him to go — not recreate, but 
to go back to the original process, pick up loose ends, 
follow through on that and then ultimately appeal again to 
the District Court. 
MS. FURSE: That's exactly right, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You anticipate his argument regarding 
the Board of Adjustment decision and as to his — as to his 
ending his administrative remedies? Do you anticipate his 
argument on that? And if you do, tell me what your response 
is. 
MS. FURSE: Well, my — what I would anticipate is 
basically an argument that this does terminate the appeal 
and that the two — that the appeal from the Third District 
from the Board of Adjustment decision can be consolidated 
with this decision without there being any harm. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. FURSE: Now, my argument to that is it's not 
about harm, it's about jurisdiction. And when we're looking 
at jurisdiction, we don't look at harm, we look simply at 
what does the Court have the authority to do? And in this 
circumstance, the only authority the Court has is to dismiss 
this case at this point. 
THE COURT: And I guess that was what I was 
looking at to save him the extra time, expense, hassle of 
jumping through hoops. But if it's a jurisdictional issue, 
I have no discretion on something like that. 
MS. FURSE: That's exactly right, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Because as you — as you argue to me 
now, I do not have jurisdiction now by allowing him and to 
recognize the — the Adjustment decision would still be doing 
something that I have no jurisdiction over. 
MS. FURSE: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MS. FURSE: That's the - and it's a similar 
problem with the notice of claim, which was also filed in 
the interim. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. FURSE: Is it's a jurisdictional matter. And 
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Hall v. Corrections states quite clearly, you can't file the 
notice of claim at the same time as you file the actual 
lawsuit. There has to be the period given. 
THE COURT: Sixty days. Isn't there 60 days or 
something like that? 
MS. FURSE: That - 60 days is the current 
jurisdictional period. And so — and that is a 
jurisdictional issue as well. So we're — so the Court lacks 
jurisdiction both for failure to comply with the notice of 
claim procedures and also for the failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
THE COURT: Now, if I — if I buy your argument and 
I dismiss without prejudice, are you telling me that 
Mr. Ramey will suffer no prejudice by virtue of the fact 
that he has started this action, it's been dismissed and he 
has to go back. There's no time limits that he's going to 
be facing, no prejudice he's going to be facing in now 
readdressing the issues pursuant to your argument? 
MS. FURSE: That's - I mean, he has a time limit, 
but he has a — he's not missed it. There is a 30-day time 
limit from the time he gets a written decision on the Board 
of Adjustment decision, which he does not — my understanding 
is he does not have yet. This does — the notice that was 
sent to you is not the written decision. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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MS. FURSE: That doesn't constitute that. 
MR. RAMEY: Your Honor, if I may. I have received 
that. I don't have copies of it for everyone — 
THE COURT: Okay. But you received it and so, 
then, it's 30 days from the date of receipt. 
MS. FURSE: Thirty days from the date of receipt. 
THE COURT: But then I'm anticipating that's time 
in the future that we can work with. 
MS. FURSE: Correct. 
MR. RAMEY: Your Honor, I believe I received that 
on the 7th. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Appreciate that. 
So he has until April 6th or — or something like 
that. 
MS. FURSE: Somewhere around there to appeal — 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. FURSE: - simply the Board of Adjustment 
decision. And then after that, then he files the notice of 
claim, which will give — you know, assuming — depending what 
that decision is. Then he's got the 60 days from the notice 
of claim and then a year from there. 
THE COURT: But to hear your argument and to 
reiterate my understanding of it is I lack jurisdiction 
because he hasn't done all of the procedural requirements. 
But if I grant your motion to dismiss, he is not having any 
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prejudice against him and as long as he files within the 
time frame of the 30 days from receiving the decision of the 
Board of Adjustment. 
MS. FURSE: That!s correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
MS. FURSE: No. That's our argument. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. FURSE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ramey. 
MR. RAMEY: Yes, sir. 
Your Honor, William Ramey, the plaintiff. 
I!d like to start off, if you wouldnft mind my 
approaching the Court and handing him a series of documents 
that I111 reference one at a time through the argument. 
THE COURT: Have they been included in your 
briefing? 
MR. RAMEY: They are not. But I have two copies 
of them for both sides. 
THE COURT: Hand it to Counsel. 
Thank you, Mr. Ramey. Thank you. 
MR. RAMEY: Ifd like to start off, Your Honor, by 
saying that, from the start, the Salt Lake City Corp. Is 
trying to couch this action as me filing a complaint seeking 
damages against the City. 
You will remember that Mr. Chambers, me and you, 
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we sat in your chambers on December 15th, I believe it was, 
and I sought a TRO with equitable relief. In equity, there 
is no jurisdictional limit for me seeking equity. This 
court has a case right here, what is it, Jenkins v. Swan, 
establishes the age-old principle in Salt Lake — or in Utah, 
pardon me, that common law exception to governmental 
immunity pertaining to equitable claims has long been 
recognized in this law, so the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act does not change that. 
So, first off, I want to get it straight that we — 
this was not an action for damages; this was an equitable 
action when it was filed. And this Court, when we were 
sitting in there, because everyone was on vacation for 
Christmas break, we delayed the time Salt Lake City would 
respond, and so I filed the Notice of Claim in that time. 
Because this was an equitable action when it started, and 
when it didn't start the actual damage portion of what I was 
complaining of as my injuries, what this case goes into as 
being what I was seeking, that was purely equity. 
Salt Lake City said, "We're not going to do 
anything; equity situation was solved." You denied the 
motion, I filed the Notice of Claim on January 5th, 60 days 
has passed by now. The claim, the Notice of Claim, doesn't 
change, it's the same claim. The only thing that's happened 
in the interim is we've gone one step further. And the 
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Board of Adjustment on their own, not called by me, met and 
issued a second non-compliance or a third non-compliance. 
But even though we1re there, just to get the facts 
of the case straight, I never even complained of the fact 
that they didn't give me — they issued a notice of non-
compliance, I complained very simply, if you turn to this 
document right here, about the procedure that Salt Lake City 
Corp. used. The procedure was I purchased a house — we'll 
go back to ninety - pardon me, '95 — purchased a house on 
August 10th. The title search — we went through the title 
search and revealed there were no adverse liens or adverse 
notices of non-compliance that were against the property. 
Soon thereafter, the Salt Lake City Corp., unknown 
to me, files a notice of non-compliance on the property, and 
I find out about it in April of '06. Pardon me, Your Honor. 
I ha<sl to think about the dates. And in April of '06, I then 
contacted Salt Lake City Corp., Kevin LaPickla, who's the 
zoning administrator, and asked Kevin, "What do I do about 
this?" 
And we talked for about two and a half minutes and 
we arrived at a decision that I had to file a special 
exception request. I prepared the special exception 
request, which takes a lot of hours. It's in my original 
affidavit. It's a large document with plans and everything 
drawn up, a large expense for me. And then I took that and 
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I filed it with him. And, in his discretion, he granted it 
and recorded on the property a certificate of compliance 
that that air conditioner was placed properly on the 
property. 
I then get a job offer in Houston that I take. 
And I move to Houston in August. And so then, in November, 
on November 21st or — yeah, November 21st, I get a call from 
Kevin saying, "We1re going to issue another certificate of 
non-compliance." And so that's when I arranged the plane 
tickets to come out to file the TRO. And we all know how 
the story goes from there; Ms. Furse has said it very well. 
But what I would like to point out is, if you went 
on the website for Title 21, Salt Lake City has on their 
website a map — flow chart how the process should work for a 
special exception. And I've highlighted the relevant 
portions. We can simply jump through in how I submitted 
everything, and I don't need to follow through with it, but 
you can see that the lines go the way the — if the special 
exceptions — if it doesn't meet the special exception 
standards, meaning that all neighbors have to sign off on 
it, it then goes to an administrative hearing where Kevin 
LaPickla, being the zoning administrator, has the authority, 
the discretion, Your Honor, to approve it, and then it goes 
to an issue of permit. 
Nowhere in this procedure is there anywhere for 
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the Salt Lake City Corp. to come back and issue another 
certificate of non-compliance. So what Ifm — what I was 
complaining of in the TRO, was to stop that entire process, 
if you remember, that, "Wait, something1s broken here. 
Something's not working right. We have policies that we're 
supposed to follow. We have a — we have guidelines that 
they published for us to look at the public that they're 
supposed to follow," and they're out of bounds in doing 
that." And that's what I was originally filing on. 
Going to the administrative remedies. This was 
never filed as an exhaustion of my administrative remedies, 
it was filed to actually say, "Hey, wait, there are no 
administrative procedures in this case. We need a court now 
to tell Salt Lake City that they have to follow their own 
guidelines." 
I was a bona fide purchaser of (inaudible) from 
the start, through a long talk, I went ahead and did the 
special exception and even got that approved. And now 
they've gone back and again changed their mind. 
And so we could sit here right today — right here 
today, Your Honor, and tomorrow they could issue a 
certificate of compliance based on the facts that have 
happened today. And I think we need your input, Your Honor, 
yourself to tell them how they should be doing things, that 
they need to follow their own procedures. And that's what I 
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was complaining of. 
The 60 days, again, I filed the notice to the City 
which was, I believe, filed with your court on the 5th of 
January, the notice of the notice on January 5th. So that 
means the 60 days have even passed. So even if we assumed 
that you have to wait 60 days, which, technically, the City 
has 60 days, but there's a statutory period that I must wait 
that period to file, it's just how long the City has to be 
back with me. But their continued prosecution of this suit 
actually tells me what they're doing. And the original 
filing of the TRO should in itself, as an equitable form of 
remedy, serve as notice in any case. Because it was filed 
with the city recorder's office when I filed the TRO. 
See, it's hard to even — to even say that that 
document alone didn't suffice as notice. It wasn't styled 
"Notice to City" would be the only thing that it wasn't. 
So, yes, I mean, in every ground, I've covered all the 
jurisdictional bases for this court, and I can't see where 
the court, under any understanding of the actual facts, 
doesn't have jurisdiction, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything more? 
MR. RAMEY: No. That's it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ramey. Appreciate your 
argument. Directly to the point. 
Ms. Furse, your rebuttal? 
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MS. FURSE: The case submitted to you by - by 
Mr. Ramey does not address the issue of the Court's 
jurisdiction. The Court has to have jurisdiction before it 
can do anything other than rule — than dismiss a case. And 
that doesn't exist in this matter. And the case on the 
issue of failure to — failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies is the Haun v. Utah versus — or Utah Department of 
Public Safety, which is cited to you in our brief, which 
cites: 
If a plaintiff has failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, then we lack subject 
matter jurisdiction and we must dismiss the case. 
And that's as to administrative remedies. 
With respect to the notice of claim, that matter 
is set forth in Hall v. Utah versus — State Department of 
Corrections, which is also cited to you in the briefs. And 
it states that — by filing a notice of claim in that case, 
it was, at the same time as the case was filed not after the 
case was filed. 
Hall deprived the State of the opportunity to 
assess his allegations and to decide, as required 
by statute, whether to prove or deny the claims. 
And, thus, it dismissed the case. 
In this case, the notice was filed even after the 
case was actually filed. So it's clear, under the Utah 
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Governmental Immunity Act that it — that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction unless the notice is filed prior. 
THE COURT: And, thus, affording Salt Lake City 
the opportunity to respond to it. 
MS. FURSE: Exactly, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MS. FURSE: That's all. 
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. 
MS. FURSE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Appreciate the argument. Very concise 
and to the point. I'll take it under advisement and then 
get something out to you soon. Thank you both. 
MR. RAMEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MS. FURSE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the 
hearing was concluded.) 
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CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff tax-
payer sought review of a decision of the Dis-
trict Court (Utah), which dismissed her com-
plaint against defendants, educational employ-
ees, county employees, and state employees, 
which sought a judgment concerning certain 
aspects of the state educational system and 
school districts and concerning the taxing prac-
tices of the county and the state. 
OVERVIEW: The taxpayer brought a multi-
party and multi-faceted action, and in one divi-
sion complaint, she sought judgment concern-
ing certain aspects of the educational system of 
the state and five of its school districts and con-
cerning the taxing practices of the county and 
the state. The district court dismissed the com-
plain i as to all parties. On appeal, the court af-
firmed in part and reversed in part and held that 
the taxpayer's action alleging that local school 
districts were prohibited from hiring state legis-
lators during the term of their office was prop-
erly dismissed because absent some claim of 
specific injury that was casually related to the 
alleged illegal activity, the taxpayer did not 
meet the standing test of having a personal 
stake in the controversy. On the other hand, the 
taxpayer clearly had standing to demand a re-
fund of her 1980 property tax based on the 
claim that the tax statute was unconstitutional 
because the constitutionality of a tax statute 
could be raised in an action properly filed pur-
suant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-1 in the dis-
trict court. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed in part and 
reversed and remanded in part the decision of 
the district court, which dismissed the tax-
payer's action concerning certain aspects of the 
educational system of the state and five of its 
school districts and concerning the taxing prac-
tices of the county and the state. 
CORE TERMS: property taxes, governmental 
immunity, school districts, textbook, protest, 
teacher, resident, declaratory judgment, expen-
diture, exempt, public interest, personal stake, 
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equitable, notice, school systems, cause of ac-
tion, adverse impact, religious, adversely, taxa-
tion, educators, societal, entity, common law, 
governmental actions, failed to comply, 
branches of government, private property, edu-
cator-legislators, educational 
LcxisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > 
General Overview 
Ci^il Procedure > Declaratory Judgment Ac-
tions > State Judgments > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Remedies > Injunctions > 
General Overview 
[H M1 ] Injunctive relief is a traditional equitable 
remedy in the appropriate cases, but as with 
other common law remedies, the moving party 
must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the c tirt. The same jurisdictional standard ap-
plies io declaratory judgments. The statutory 
creation of relief in the form of a declaratory 
judgment does not create a cause of action or 
gram jurisdiction to the court where it would 
no i ciherwise exist. The Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Statute merely authorizes a new form 
of relief, which in some cases provides a fuller 
and rore adequate remedy than that which ex-
is!..; ; ier the common law. 
CV-v.' Procedure > Declaratory Judgment Ac-
ti( 'is > Federal Judgments > General Over-
view 
dfts -Uttional Law > The Judiciary > Case or 
Con!*rversy > Ripeness 
[1 !N Four requirements must be satisfied be-
fo e e district court can proceed in an action 
fo declaratory judgment: (1) there must be a 
justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the 
pa. lie must be adverse; (3) the parties seeking 
re \-'\ must have a legally protectible interest in 
the controversy; and (4) the issues between the 
pa; li must be ripe for judicial determination. 
Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > 
Personal Stake 
Governments > State & Territorial Govern-
ments > General Overview 
[HN3] For standing, plaintiff must be able to 
show that he suffers some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives him a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute. It is generally in-
sufficient for a plaintiff to assert only a general 
interest he shares in common with members of 
the public at large. The court cannot entertain 
generalized grievances that are more appropri-
ately directed to the legislative and executive 
branches of the state government. 
Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > 
Personal Stake 
Constitutional Law > The Judiciary > Case or 
Controversy > Standing > Elements 
[HN4] The judicial power of the state of Utah 
is not constitutionally restricted by the lan-
guage of U.S. Const, art. Ill requiring "cases" 
and "controversies," since no similar require-
ment exists in the Utah Constitution. The court 
may grant standing where matters of great pub-
lic interest and societal impact are concerned. 
However, the requirement that the plaintiff 
have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal 
dispute is rooted in the historical and constitu-
tional role of the judiciary in Utah. 
Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > 
General Overview 
[HN5] The requirement that a plaintiff have a 
personal stake in the outcome of a dispute is 
intended to confine the courts to a role consis-
tent with the separation of powers, and to limit 
the jurisdiction of the courts to those disputes 
which are most efficiently and effectively re-
solved through the judicial process. The courts 
are most competent in the exercise of their 
function when they have a concrete factual con-
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text conducive to a realistic appreciation of the 
consequences of judicial action. 
Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > 
Gene: ill Overview 
[HN( I A plaintiff with a direct and personal 
strke in the outcome of a dispute aids the court 
in its deliberations by fully developing all the 
m iji i! factual and legal issues in an effort to 
cc r iiue the court that the relief requested re-
dresses the claimed injury. 
ConsfPutional Law > The Judiciary > General 
0 ••«./;• ien> 
[li • Constitutionally, the courts have the 
du !• biigation to apply statutory and common 
la-.' -inciples to a particular dispute and to 
ev;i!uaie those principles against governing 
couMiluuonal standards. 
C/V/' Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > 
J i rial Stake 
[\ ...'\X; Although the court has power to grant 
si; : r u where matters of great public interest 
a: i cietal impact are concerned, the court 
does not readily relieve a plaintiff of the salu-
to; y rev; u irement of showing a real and personal 
interest in the dispute. 
C:"'" rocedure > Justiciability > Standing > 
1 v : a I Stake 
[i ' The court engages in a three-step in-
q\ r J reviewing the question of a plaintiffs 
st: v;': e to sue. The first step in the inquiry is 
di;e< le,! io the traditional criteria of the plain-
til .V personal stake in the controversy. One 
w1 o ' adversely affected by governmental ac-
ti< es is standing under this criterion. One who 
is • diversely affected has no standing. A 
n*. : legation of an adverse impact is not suf-
fi a There must also be some causal rela-
te u i e alleged between the injury to the plain-
tiff, the governmental actions and the relief re-
quested. Because standing questions are usually 
raised prior to the introduction of any evidence, 
the court is necessarily required to make a 
judgment whether proof of such a causal rela-
tionship is difficult or impossible and whether 
the relief requested is substantially likely to re-
dress the injury claimed. If the plaintiff satisfies 
this requirement, he is granted standing and no 
further inquiry is required. 
Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > 
General Overview 
[HN10] If the plaintiff does not have standing 
under the first step in the three-step inquiry of 
standing, the court addresses the question of 
whether there is anyone who has a greater in-
terest in the outcome of the case than the plain-
tiff. If there is no one, and if the issue is 
unlikely to be raised at all if the plaintiff is de-
nied standing, this court grants standing. When 
standing is predicated on the assertion that the 
issues involve great public interest and societal 
impact, the court retains our practical concern 
that the parties involved have the interest nec-
essary to effectively assist the court in develop-
ing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual 
questions. The court denies standing when a 
plaintiff does not satisfy the first requirement of 
the analysis and there are potential plaintiffs 
with a more direct interest in the issues who 
can more adequately litigate the issues. 
Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Standing > 
General Overview 
[HN11] The third step in the three-step analysis 
of standing is to decide if the issues raised by 
the plaintiff are of sufficient public importance 
in and of themselves to grant him standing. The 
absence of a more appropriate plaintiff does not 
automatically justify granting standing to a par-
ticular plaintiff. This court must still determine, 
on a case-by-case basis, that the issues are of 
sufficient weight and that they are not more 
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propc'v addressed by the other branches of 
gever --icnt. 
Chi! procedure > Justiciability > General 
Overv;''\v 
Crunh-al Law & Procedure > Criminal Of-
fenses > Miscellaneous Offenses > General 
0^r.'.:w 
E ':tc\ ::)ti Law > Departments of Education > 
Si te , a rtments of Education > Authority 
[I-iNfi: ; Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-10 provides 
thnt m mbers of boards of education are guilty 
of a : sdemeanor if those persons refuse or 
nc ' i lo enforce the use of textbooks adopted 
by v tah State Textbook commission. 
E 'an /'•>// Law > Departments of Education > 
Si 'te Hirtments of Education > Authority 
Ei in'.- on. Law > Instruction > General Over-
vi r 
[I \ '• Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-2 states that 
us • ; ie textbooks adopted by the state text-
b e >!•* in mission is mandatory in all districts 
ar 1 ; h schools of the state. 
G vc cuts > Courts > Court Personnel 
G ncnts > Local Governments > Li-
ce
 ,;
 V 
7Vv .M' > State & Local Taxes > General 
a • • • • v . 
[i < Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11 provides 
th i n a party deems a levy to be unlawful, 
si! h : ly may pay under protest such tax and 
th «v •} the party so paying or his legal rep-
re :; c may bring an action in the tax divi-
Sh :; ;c appropriate district court against the 
cl o whom said tax or license was paid, or 
ar : he state, county, municipality or other 
ta ; • ;lit on whose behalf the same was col-
ic ' o recover said tax paid under protest. 
N | jular form of protest is required and in 
tli ;• nee of the creation of a tax court in the 
6\ s ,:i which the action is filed, the bringing 
of an action in the appropriate district court is 
deemed as being in compliance with § 59-11-
11. 
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes 
[HN15] The constitutionality or legality of a 
tax statute may be raised in an action that is 
properly filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
59-11-1 in the district court. 
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > General 
Overview 
[HN16] The court extends the taxpayers right 
to sue concerning illegal use of public monies 
to include an action against the state. 
Civil Procedure > Equity > General Overview 
[HN17] Taxpayers may resort to a court of eq-
uity to prevent the misapplication of public 
funds, and the right is based upon the taxpay-
ers' equitable ownership of such funds and their 
liability to replenish the public treasury for the 
deficiency which is be caused by the misappro-
priation. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Of-
fenses > Miscellaneous Offenses > Abuse of 
Public Office > Neglect of Office > Elements 
Governments > State & Territorial Govern-
ments > Claims By & Against 
[HN18] See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11. 
Torts > Public Entity Liability > Immunity > 
General Overview 
[HN19] The word "injury" is defined in Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(6) as death, injury to a 
person, damage to or loss of property, or any 
other injury that a person may suffer to his per-
son, or estate, that would be actionable if in-
flicted by a private person or his agent. The 
definition of "injury" underscores the real con-
675 P.2d 1145, *; 1983 Utah LEXIS 1204, ** 
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cern cr'-\e governmental immunity act, namely 
that ; vernmental entity, like individuals and 
priva* * ntities, should be liable for an injury 
inflir : by it. 
Govcrr tents > Local Governments > Admin-
istra:'\ Boards 
Gove merits > State & Territorial Govern-
men Claims By & Against 
Tax > State & Local Taxes > Personal 
Pmr Tax > Exempt Property > General 
[HN: See Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-2. 
CO I £L: [**1] Thomas S. Taylor, Provo, 
Uia;; Plaintiff. 
D:iv" . Wilkinson, Attorney General, Salt 
Lake •>', Utah, William Evans, Asst. Atty. 
Go: Salt Lake City Utah, Felshaw King, 
Clcii I, Utah, David L. Church & Michael 
T. \ oy, Salt Lake City, Utah, Bruce 
Fine' . Salt Lake City, Utah, Ron Elton, 
Too-' Utah, Ted Cannon, Salt Lake County 
AHy .. i Lake City, Utah, Bill Thomas Peters, 
D c r - , S.L. Co. Atty, Salt Lake City, Utah for 
L;! , ' .;t 
of its school districts, and concerning the taxing 
practices of Salt Lake County and the state of 
Utah. Apparently none of the defendants [**2] 
considered it necessary to exercise their rights 
under Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to require a more definite statement 
in light of what is arguably an ambiguous com-
plaint. All the defendants, rather, proceeded 
under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to ask that the entire complaint be 
dismissed for, inter alia, a lack of jurisdiction 
because Jenkins lacked standing to press these 
claims, failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted, failure to comply with the 
Utah governmental immunity statute, U.C.A., 
1953, § 63-30-1 to -38 (1978 and Supp. 1981 
and Interim Supp. 1983), and the previous ad-
judication of the issues in similar suits filed by 
Jenkins. l In response to these motions, the dis-
trict court dismissed Jenkins1 complaint "as to 
all of the defendants" because: (1) Jenkins 
lacked standing, (2) Jenkins failed to comply 
with notice and undertaking requirements of 
the governmental immunity act, and (3) the 
matter was res judicata as "most issues" have 
already been decided by the Utah Supreme 
Court. On appeal, Jenkins asks that the district 
court's order of dismissal be reversed. 
JIKS :: Durham, Justice, wrote the opinion. 
We ir: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Dal-
lin ] ks, Justice. Wahlquist, District Judge: 
con . ::ig and dissenting. Stewart, Justice, 
dir.:- Howe, Justice, does not participate 
here' ahlquist, District Judge, sat. 
CP r N BY: DURHAM 
OP: N 
17] Plaintiff/appellant, Lynn A. Jen-
kins -nkins), has filed this multi-party and 
run -' eted lawsuit which defies a simple and 
cor explanation. In a one division com-
plin: ected to all defendants, Jenkins seeks 
a ;•!=• nt concerning certain aspects of the 
edi: ial system of the state of Utah and five 
1 Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 
289 (1980); Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585 
P.2d 442 (1978). 
[**3] The first set of defendants which can 
be identified in Jenkins' complaint are those 
related to the Utah educational system. These 
individual defendants can be matched with 
their respective school systems as follows: de-
fendant Swan is a teacher for the Tooele School 
District; defendants Curan and Burningham are 
teachers for the Davis School District; defen-
dant Bishop is a teacher and defendant Alfor is 
a principal for the Ogden School District; and 
defendant LeFevere is Director of Personnel for 
the Weber School District. The Jordan School 
District, the State of Utah, Superintendent of 
Public Instruction Walter D. Talbot, and the 
Page 6 
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Hducational Association are also defen-
renkins' complaint prays for judgment 
ows: 
!. A declaration that the local 
S liool Districts and the Utah De-
I ; tment of Public Instruction are 
;,:;• ^ hibited from hiring Utah legis-
lators during the term of their of-
;lce or continuing such legislators 
•o employees once they become 
members of legislature. Article V, 
Section 1 and Article VI, § 6 of the 
Ijah State Constitution, state, re-
s; xtively, (a) "no person charged 
\ :h the exercise of the powers 
pioperly belonging to one of these 
departments [**4] [of the Utah 
government], shall exercise any 
i actions appertaining to either of 
;lv; others," and (b) that "no person 
h Iding any public office of profit 
o: trust under authority . . . . of this 
• ite, shall be a member of the leg-
is iture." 
2. A declaration that the educa-
te -legislators named as individual 
a endants are in violation of Utah 
C de Ann. § 67-16 (1953) for fail-
ir i to file a conflict of interest dis-
ci sure statement concerning mon-
ie allegedly received from the 
l ih Education Association during 
ts ; time when the legislature is in 
session. 
3. A permanent restraining or-
der prohibiting the Utah Educa-
te rial Association from paying, 
lr ing, loaning or gifting educa-
te s-legislators during the term of 
t' ir office as legislators. 
[*1148] 4. A declaration that 
t!-- "Utah State Textbook Commis-
si n" and the mandatory use of 
tc tbook provisions of Utah law, § 
53-13-2 and 53-13-10, U.C.A., 
1953, is unconstitutional, since it is 
in violation of Article X, § 9 of the 
Utah State Constitution, which 
states: "Neither the Legislature nor 
the State Board of Education shall 
have power to prescribe textbooks 
to be used in the common 
schools." 
The second category [**5] of issues ad-
dressed in Jenkins1 complaint relates to taxation 
and certain expenditures of public funds. It ap-
pears that Jenkins' demand for relief is directed 
to the Salt Lake County Attorney, the Salt Lake 
County Commission, the Salt Lake County 
Treasurer, the State of Utah, the Utah Attorney 
General and the Utah Tax Commission. Jen-
kins filed a protest with his 1980 property 
taxes, which were paid in the amount of 
$807.89. He prays for the following relief: 
1. A refund of his 1980 property 
tax. 
2. An order to Salt Lake 
County to prepare, publish and up-
date a list of all exempt taxable 
property, itemized by owner valua-
tion and amount of tax forgiven; 
3. A declaratory judgment that 
the funding of the Uniform State 
Public Education System by local 
property tax is unconstitutional as 
not providing for equal distribution 
of tax throughout the state and be-
ing a denial of equal protection. 
4. A declaratory judgment that 
providing public property and pub-
lic services to religious organiza-
tions which are exempt from the 
payment of property tax is in viola-
tion of Article 1, § 4 of the Ut^h 
State Constitution, which states: 
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"1he State shall make no law re-
specting an [**6] establishment of 
rciigion" and "no public money or 
property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious wor-
ship, exercise or instruction or for 
the support of any ecclesiastical es-
tablishment." 
I. 
We consider first the question of whether 
Jenkins had standing to raise those issues con-
cerning :he service in the Utah Legislature of 
Utah educators. The threshold requirement that 
Jenkins have standing is equally applicable 
whether he seeks declaratory or injunctive re-
lief | H Ml] Injunctive relief is a traditional eq-
uitable remedy in the appropriate cases, but as 
with other common law remedies, the moving 
party m-st have standing to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of ihe court. The same jurisdictional stan-
dard applies to declaratory judgments. The 
statutory creation of relief in the form of a de-
claia orv judgment does not create a cause of 
actio;! o grant jurisdiction to the court where it 
would rot otherwise exist. The Utah Declara-
tory J tie ;ment Statute merely authorizes a new 
form of relief, which in some cases will provide 
a fui'er and more adequate remedy than that 
whieii e: :isted under the common law. Gray v. 
Dcju. If 3 Utah 339, 135 P.2d251 (1943). 
vre have previously held [**7J that [HN2] 
four eonirements must be satisfied before the 
distr t rourt can proceed in an action for de-
clar:i M \ judgment: "(1) there must be a justici-
able ii.-or roversy; (2) the interests of the parties 
miisi be adverse; (3) the parties seeking relief 
miisi h;ve a legally protectible interest in the 
con! ovcisy; and (4) the issues between the par-
ties nu>t be ripe for judicial determination." 
Jcnk. is v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980) 
(cilir i laird v. State, Utah, 5"*-! V Id riJ 
(1978)). See also Main Parking Mall v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., Utah, 531 P.2d 866 (1975); 
Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818 
(1951). Requirements (2) and (3) represent the 
traditional test for standing. [HN3] Plaintiff 
must be able to show that he has suffered some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a 
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dis-
pute. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 45 L. 
Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975); Stromquist 
v. Cokayne, Utah, 646 P.2d 746 (1982); Sears 
v. Ogden City, Utah, 572 P.2d 1359 (1977); 
Main Parking Mall. It is generally insufficient 
for a [*1149] plaintiff to assert only a general 
interest he shares in common with members of 
the [**8] public at large. See Stromquist; 
Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978). We 
will not entertain generalized grievances that 
are more appropriately directed to the legisla-
tive and executive branches of the state gov-
ernment. 
Unlike the federal system, [HN4] the judi-
cial power of the state of Utah is not constitu-
tionally restricted by the language of Article III 
of the United States Constitution requiring 
"cases" and "controversies," since no similar 
requirement exists in the Utah Constitution. 
We previously have held that "this Court may 
grant standing where matters of great public 
interest and societal impact are concerned." 
Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585 P.2d 442, 443 
(1978) (footnote omitted). However, the re-
quirement that the plaintiff have a personal 
stake in the outcome of a legal dispute is rooted 
iii the historical and constitutional role of the 
judiciary in I Jtali. 
Historically, the courts were an extension of 
the executive branch and were developed to 
resolve disputes between private parties, and 
between the government as a land owner and 
private parties concerning the use and owner-
ship of land. With the advent of mercantilism, 
industrialization and urbanization, the courts 
[**9] became increasingly concerned with dis-
putes over the regulation of economic activity 
675 P.2d 
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by private contract, and injuries to individuals 
in their daily activities in a crowded and com-
plex society. "The liability of one individual to 
another under the law . . . . is a matter of pri-
vate rights Private-rights disputes . . . . lie 
at the core of the historically recognized judi-
cial power." Northern Pipeline Construction 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
102 S. Ct. 2858, 2870-71, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598 
(19-') (citations omitted). The courts devel-
oped ways of identifying and categorizing par-
tial!: r grievances, techniques for the receipt of 
in Toi Kiiion, and principles for arriving at a 
resolution of these disputes. See generally T. 
Piuci neit, A Concise History of the Common 
Law 5th ed. 1956). In the course of this de-
velopment, the judiciary emerged as a govern-
ment 1 institution distinct from the executive. 
The ic:itification of the judiciary as one of 
three separate and equal branches of govern-
rr.cn' \\\ our written state Constitution must be 
view j !a light of this historical development. 
i lie rent in the tripartite allocation of gov-
ernm nfil powers is the historical [**10] and 
prnp *-n!;c conviction that particular disputes 
are i ost amenable to resolution in particular 
ft p.:- •;. [HN5] The requirement that a plaintiff 
h \ i personal stake in the outcome of a dis-
pute ; intended to confine the courts to a role 
c< "I:- it with the separation of powers, and to 
lir.i:' • jurisdiction of the courts to those dis-
pute: which are most efficiently and effectively 
reso ee through the judicial process. See Flast 
v. G '•,</, 392 U.S. 83, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947, 88 S. 
C . 1 VI (1968). The courts are most competent 
ij \\: exercise of their function when they have 
a "e, ;.ete factual context conducive to a real-
h ic ppreciation of the consequences of judi-
ci • •., >n." Valley Forge Christian College v. 
A;-n reus United for Separation of Church 
ana ;aie, 454 U.S. 464, 102 S. Ct. 752, 758, 
7 ) I id. 2d 700 (1982). [HN6] A plaintiff 
with : direct and personal stake in the outcome 
of a :w)ute will aid the court in its delibera-
tions fully developing all the material fac-
ti ii ; •;,; legal issues in an effort to convince the 
court that the relief requested will redress the 
claimed injury. 
[HN7] Constitutionally, the courts have the 
dual obligation to apply statutory and common 
law principles [**11] to a particular dispute 
and to evaluate those principles against govern-
ing constitutional standards. The propriety of 
such action by the federal courts has been rec-
ognized since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), and this Court 
has recognized that it is the inherent role of the 
judiciary to interpret constitutional provisions. 
See Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674 (1982); 
Jenkins v. State. In the proper discharge of their 
duty in this regard, the courts must necessarily 
defer on some issues to the other branches of 
state government, For example, the airing of 
generalized grievances [*1150] and the vindi-
cation of public rights are properly addressed to 
the legislature, a forum where freewheeling de-
bate on hi-Kid issues of public policy is in or-
der. 
To grant standing iu u litigant, 
who cannot distinguish himself 
from all citizens, would be a sig-
nificant inroad on the representa-
tive form of government, and cast 
the courts in the role of supervising 
the coordinate branches of gov-
ernment. It would convert the judi-
ciary into an open forum for the 
resolution of political and ideo-
logical disputes about the perform-
ance of government. 
[**12] Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 
717(1978), 
An overstepping of appropriate restraints on 
judicial review of such political and ideological 
disputes is not only constitutionally and histori-
cally inappropriate, but also unwise. Although 
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the 1 ''ah judiciary is not life-tenured, the fol-
low : observation is applicable: 
Repeated and essentially head-on 
confrontations between the life-
tenured branch and representative 
branches of government will not, 
ia the long run, be beneficial to ei-
ther. The public confidence essen-
(;; I to the former and the vitality 
critical to the latter may well erode 
if we do not exercise self-restraint 
in the utilization of our power to 
n« gative the actions of the other 
branches. 
Uivff'ti States v. Richardson, L.; \,.>, 166, 
IS;:. : L. Ed. 2d 678, 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1074) 
(Pov 11. J., concurring). 
T o afore, despite our recognition of this 
[HN ( ourt's power to "grant standing where 
matlv ; )£ great public interest and societal im-
pact a o concerned," this Court will not readily 
relic v a. plaintiff of the salutory requirement of 
slio^ a real and personal interest in the dis-
P'U:. i light of the historical, constitutional 
aiu: : aical considerations [**13] discussed 
abo\ . \ve [HN9] engage in a three-step inquiry 
in iv .ring the question of a plaintiffs stand-
ing ; e. The first step in the inquiry will be 
dire', : :o the traditional criteria of the plain-
tiffs a sonal stake in the controversy. One 
whu dversely affected by governmental ac-
ti' •;:• .; standing under this criterion. One 
wo ..ot adversely affected has no standing. 
A a J allegation of an adverse impact is not 
suli *aa There must also be some causal re-
in! i; /:':) alleged between the injury to the 
p!ai; the governmental actions and the re-
lief ; a asted. Because standing questions are 
usi:: raised prior to the introduction of any 
e\-k.. : we will necessarily be required to 
n f i judgment whether proof of such a 
can relationship is difficult or impossible 
ana ie her the relief requested is substantially 
likely to redress the injury claimed. K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 22.20 at 368-70 
(1982 Supp.). If the plaintiff satisfies this re-
quirement, he will be granted standing and no 
further inquiry is required. 
[HN10] If the plaintiff does not have stand-
ing under the first step, we will then address the 
question of whether there is anyone who has 
[**14] a greater interest in the outcome of the 
case than the plaintiff. If there is no one, and if 
the issue is unlikviy to be raised at all if the 
plaintiff is denied standing, this Court will 
grant standing. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 
Alaska, 559 P.2d 630, 635 (1977). When stand-
ing is predicated on the assertion that the issues 
involve "great public interest and societal im-
pact," we will retain our practical concern that 
the parties involved have the interest necessary 
to effectively assist the court in developing and 
reviewing all relevant legal and factual ques-
tions. The Court will deny standing when a 
plaintiff does not satisfy the first requirement of 
the analysis and there are potential plaintiffs 
with a more direct interest in the issues who 
can more adequately litigate the issues. 
[HN11] The third step in the analysis is to 
decide if the issues raised by the plaintiff are of 
sufficient public importance in and of them-
selves to grant him standing. The absence of a 
more appropriate plaintiff will not automati-
cally justify granting standing to a particular 
plaintiff. This Court must still determine, on a 
case-by-case basis, that the issues are of suffi-
cient weight, see Jenkins [**15] v. Finlinson, 
Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980), [*1151] and that 
they are not more properly addressed b> the 
other branches of government. Constitutional 
and practical considerations will necessarily 
affect our decisions in cases where a plaintiff 
who lacks standing under step one nevertheless 
raises important public issues. These are mat-
ters to be more fully developed in the context 
of future cases. 
In this case, Jenkins claims that he is bring-
this complaint as a resident of the state of 
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Utah and as a "citizen, taxpayer, registered 
vote and parent" who is a member of a class of 
pers ns with a joint or common right against 
the i efendants. Jenkins is a resident of Salt 
Lake County and has paid taxes to that entity. 
Jenkas is not a resident of the Tooele, Davis, 
Ogc! w or Weber School Districts, the districts 
which employ the educators/legislators named 
as c! feniants in this action. Jenkins fails to 
ma'; any allegations that he is a resident of the 
lei'i. stive districts from which these individu-
als Jre elected. His claimed personal stake in 
the Lsue of educators serving as legislators is 
thai he vote on legislation which financially 
be: A Us them as employees of the education 
[7 >] system and that this adversely affects 
Jenk'ns as a taxpayer. 
• pkins1 mere reliance on his general status 
as ; "v-: payer and citizen does nothing to dis-
tia!••; <h him from any member of the public at 
la;;; with regard to this dispute. His challenge 
is e•';-<•' iely broad; he attacks the constitution-
al f educators serving in the Utah legisla-
tn;v hut makes no claim of a particularized 
i r : , s / to himself by virtue of the claimed 
w;r s Absent some claim of specific injury 
wk * is causally related to the alleged illegal 
a< : v, Jenkins has not met the traditional 
ss. .\g test articulated in step one above. 
• ,ni ;,1S ^ ^ g j . requests that we grant him 
st•'• eg under the rationale that he raises ques-
ti of great public interest and societal im-
p e We need not address that issue. Since 
Jc -s' claim for standing on this issue is 
pre 1( d solely on the grounds of its public 
J,.,, •':i-;Ce? we will not grant him standing 
v :he pleadings reveal other potential plaii1 
ti;; . i!: i a more direct interest in this particular 
qr . Jenkins' interest as a resident of the 
s*'* . : Utah is certainly less direct than the 
iis si of the residents of the school districts 
v.ik 1 employ these [**17] individuals or the 
lei;" -live districts from which they were 
e!e< i We need not and do not decide here 
v ' r residents of those areas would have 
standing to bring this complaint. We do find, 
however, that Jenkins1 interest is less direct 
than the interest of those living in the relevant 
school districts or legislative districts. There-
fore, we will not invoke the standing doctrine 
of "great public interest and societal impact" to 
consider his request for standing. 
We also hold that Jenkins lacks standing to 
present his claims that U.C.A., 1953, §§ 53-13-
2 and 53-13-10 are unconstitutional. [HN12] 
Section 53-13-10 provides that members of 
boards of education shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor if those persons refuse or neglect "to 
enforce the use of textbooks adopted by the 
[Utah State Textbook] commission . . . ." Jen-
kins does not allege that he is a member of a 
local board of education and therefore cannot 
contend that he is or is likely to be subject to 
prosecution under this code section. In the ab-
sence of any such personal adverse impact, 
Jenkins lacks standing to raise the issue of the 
constitutionality of the statute. See Redwood 
Gym v. Salt Lake City Commission, Utah, 
[**18] 624 P.2d 1138 (1981); Cavaness v. 
Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 349 (1979). [HN13] Sec-
tion 53-13-2 states that use of the textbooks 
adopted by the state textbook commission 
"shall be mandatory in all districts and high 
schools of the state." Jenkins fails to allege that 
this mandate adversely affects him or his chil-
dren, except insofar as it may inflict some kind 
of "spiritual" discomfort caused by the exis-
tence of a statute he believes is unconstitu-
tional. This Court may not issue an advisory 
opinion on :h\>. q.is-stion merely to relieve his 
discomfort. See Redwood Gym and Baird. Fur-
ther, members of local boards of education 
constitute a class of potential plaintiffs with a 
more direct interest in this question [*1152] 
than Jenkins, and, therefore, we will not ad-
dress the question of whether Jenkins should be 
granted standing because of the alleged public 
importance of the issues involved. 
Jenkins also requests that this Court enter 
an order directing the "educator-legislators" to 
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file n conflict of interest disclosure statement 
cone r u n g money allegedly received from the 
Uta!- fit:ucation Association. U.C.A. , 1953, § 
67-1 -12 declares it a misdemeanor for a "pub • 
lie i Ti'.-er or public [**19] employee [to] 
knev n d y and intentionally" violate the stat-
ute, he statute does not provide Jenkins with 
stnn' 'ng to act as a private attorney general in 
the ( lb: cement of this statute. This Court will 
net ume to order these defendants to do 
thus oh they are already required to do by 
sun . '. fin fact the statute even applies to leg-
i s t s. 
- ris further requests this Court to per-
rons
 s :';/ restrain the Utah Educat ion Associa-
tion '-oni providing gifts, loans and other fi-
n:Mv; support to "educator-legislators." 
U.C .. 1953, § 67-16-10 states that "no person 
S; ;• uce or seek to induce any public offi-
ce T : ublic employee to violate any of the 
p o r us of this act." The appropriate parties 
to i' • 'e any action concerning violations of 
this ite are in the executive and legislative 
brri ..-;. Jenkins' posi t ion in this situation is 
icl •;.' to that of the citizenry at large, and 
tl c: -re he lacks standing to pursue this cause 
o . *-\. 
I]. 
: e introductory port ion of this opinioii. 
v * led the relief sought by Jenkins in con-
r e with payment of his 1980 properly 
t: : Apparently these claims, as well as 
tl-o scussed above, were dismissed [**20] 
b • iistrict court on the basis that Jenkins 
h k< landing, that he failed to comply with 
t1 •: ; edural requirements of the statutes on 
g \ J: cental immunity, and that the doctrine 
of i dicata applied. Unl ike the issues cort-
ex::: educators in the legislature, none of the 
o »•;< s concerning taxation and expenditures 
r:MS'.- ' y Jenkins appear to have been previ-
o i. 'dressed to the district court or to this 
C•»•: Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata 
d cs: apply. Thus , we must review the dis-
trict court's dismissal on the issues of standing 
and the applicability of the Governmental Im-
munity Act. 
i \ 
Jenkins alleges that he paid $807.89 for 
property taxes in 1980. A copy of a Salt Lake 
County tax assessment form in that amount is 
appended to his petition along with a letter ad-
dressed to the Salt Lake County Treasurer. 
This letter advised that Jenkins' taxes had been 
paid by Prudential Federal Savings & Loan and 
that the payment of the tax was under protest. 
The letter is dated November 29, 1980, the date 
noted on the tax assessment forms as the dead-
line for payment of the 1980 property taxes. 
[HN14] U.C.A., 1953, § 59-11-11 (Supp. 1981) 
provides that when a party deems [**21] a 
levy to be unlawful, "such party may pay under 
protest such tax . and thereupon the party so 
paying or his legal representative may bring an 
action in the tax division of the appropriate dis-
trict court against the officer to w h o m said tax 
or license was paid, or against the state, county, 
municipality or other taxing unit on whose be-
half the same was collected, to recover said tax 
. . . . paid under protest." No particular form of 
protest is required, Murdoch v. Murdoch, 38 
Utah 373, 113 P. 330 (1911), and in the ab^ 
sence of the creation of a tax court in the dis-
trict in which the action is filed, the bringing of 
an action in the appropriate district court is 
deemed as being in compliance with § 59-11-
11. See U.C.A., 1953, §§ 59-24-1 to -9 (Supp. 
1981 and Interim Supp. 1983). For purposes o f 
our review, we assume Jenkins' allegations that 
he paid his 1980 property taxes and filed the 
letter of protest appended to his petition are 
true. 
[HN15] The constitutionality or legality of 
a tax statute may be raised in an action that is 
properly filed pursuant to § 59-11-1 in the dis-
trict court. See State Tax Commission [*1153] 
v. Wright, I Jtah, 596 P.2d 634 (1979). There-
fore, [**22] Jenkins clearly has standing to 
demand a refund of his 1980 property tax based 
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on 1 :s claim that the tax statute pursuant to 
whi i all or part of that tax was assessed is un-
co: tu'ional. Jenkins1 specific claim is that 
the : -stem of uniform funding of state public 
eriiu: ion by local property taxes is unconstitu-
tion; . We hold that Jenkins has standing to 
denv id a refund of all or part of his 1980 
pro; !y taxes based on his allegation of the 
unc s: i tutionality of this statutory scheme. 
nl ins also requests this Court to declare 
the : nviding of public property and public ser-
v •:-.: !o religious organizations, which are ex-
e? • by law from the payment of property 
t a : • : - • • unconstitutional under Art. 1, Sec. 4 of 
the (; h Constitution. This Court has long 
hHr i: t a taxpayer has standing to prosecute 
an :• iui against municipalities and other po-
ll:: subdivisions of the state for illegal ex-
pa u res. In an early case involving expendi-
ti : I) the construction of a water distribution 
sy>\ i5 we said: 
To the extent that the water rates 
are excessive his taxes are in-
creased, and the mere fact that it 
;; creases in like proportion the 
!; xes of all other taxpayers does 
n- t [**23] deprive him of the right 
< maintain an action to arrest the 
waste of public funds. 
Ihir !ailt v. Ogden Waterworks Co., J J U L . 
2>T .-,5-96, 93 P. 828, 831 (1908). See also 
Tnc- ' lluilding Association v. Tooele High 
Set;. ' District, 43 TTml> 362, 134 P 894 
(19: » 
%
 have also [HN16] extended the tax-
pay- ; right to sue concerning illegal use of 
pi:: i monies to include an action against the 
s i • > < • ' ; h Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 
P ' ' S (1951), we reviewed the various ar 
g •! i • (I for and against the grant of such a tax-
p : !; aht of action and concluded that it 
s 1 •-* 'be permitted in this state. M[A] taxpayer 
should be permitted to enjoin the unlawful ex-
penditure of tax moneys in which he has a pe-
cuniary interest, or to prevent increased levies 
for illegal purposes." Id at 441, 228 P.2d at 
821. In arriving at this conclusion, we quoted 
with approval the following language of the 
Illinois Supreme Court: 
^ye j i a v e r epeatediy held that 
[HN17] taxpayers may resort to a 
court of equity to prevent the mis-
application of public funds, and 
that this right is based upon the 
taxpayers' equitable ownership of 
such funds and their liability to re-
plenish the public treasury [**24] 
for the deficiency which would be 
caused by the misappropriation. 
Id at 443, 228 P.2d at 823 (quoting Fergus v. 
Russel, 270 111. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915)) 
In applying the foregoing authorities to this 
case, we note that Jenkins makes allegations 
concerning the limited amount of private prop-
erty in the state of IItali subject to state taxa-
tion. He further alleges that because of the lim-
ited amount of property available for taxation 
and the unconstitutional expenditure of tax dol-
lars on religious institutions which have large 
property holdings but pay no property tax, he 
must pay increased taxes as an owner of tax-
able private property. He has alleged that he is 
directly and adversely affected by this govern-
mental action. We hold that these allegations 
give him standing under the test set out in Sec-
tion I of this opinion. In arriving at this conclu-
sion, we need not determine the extent of the 
adverse impact on Jenkins; we only conclude 
that he has alleged a direct adverse impact 
which may be subject to proof, and it is likely 
that if the governmental action is declared un-
constitutional, the adverse impact on Jenkins 
will be relieved. We hold, therefore, that Jen-
kins [**25] has standing to raise his claim 
concerning the unconstitutional expenditure of 
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public monies on tax exempt private property 
held "w religious organizations as part of his 
chir i:!ed under IJ.C.A., 1953, § 59-11-11 
(Sup •. 1981). 
P. 
The motions of the defendants to dismiss 
Jenkms' entire complaint were granted on the 
basis d:at he failed to comply with the l-iali 
C >v -r. mental Immunity Act. .v.- I • (\A . 
1' :. ;" 63-30-1 to -38 (1978 & [*1154] Supp. 
T m ,'v Interim Supp. 1983). We need only 
ad d s 11 lis issue in connection with Jenkins' 
clam for the return of his property tax under § 
59-1 -1 1 as those are the only causes of action 
conct nmg which we have found Jenkins to 
haw a siding. 
x
 district court found that Jenkins had 
f,:i • in comply with the notice and undertak-
h i mements of the Governmental Immii 
ir ;• .'• ;. Section 63-30-11 of that Act now 
p: cvi ;s that: 
JTTN18] Any person having a 
c'aim for injury against a govern-
:rental entity or against an em-
ployee shall before maintaining an 
Mon for an act or omission oc-
a ring during the performance of 
m. duties, within the scope of em-
s'oyment, or under color of author-
ity, shall file a written notice of 
c a i i n with such [**26] entity. 
[I!N"d The word "injury" is defined in § 63-
.3("-2v i as "death, injury to a person, damage to 
or lo: oi" property, or any other injury that a 
pc;s( may suffer to his person, or estate, d-
wmi! )e actionable if inflicted by a private 
perse oi his agent." This definition of "injury" 
undo- -ores the real concern of the governmen 
tal in aunity act, namely that "a governmental 
en! i -.' I I .\ e individuals and private entities, 
si >u be liable for an injury inflicted by it." 
S. nu n\i v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 605 
P.2d 1230, 1234 (1980). See also Thomas v. 
Clearfield City, Utah, 642 P.2d 737 (1982). 
Jenkins' claim for an adjustment on his prop-
erty taxes is neither an "injury" as defined in § 
63-30-2(6) nor is it an "action under this act." 
Jenkins is prosecuting this action under a sepa-
rate statutory authorization, § 59-11-11, which 
predates the enactment of the Governmental 
Immunity Act and which provides a distinct 
and separate basis for his claim against the 
government. The cause of action authorized 
under § 59-11-11 has its own notice provision 
in the form of the requirement to pay the tax 
under protest and has its own statute of limita-
tion. Seel J.C.A., [**27] 1953, § 78-12-31. It 
is not governed by the notice or undertaking 
requirements in the Governmental Immunity 
Jenkins seeks equitable relief in the form of 
i declaratory judgment, in addition to a return 
t ; die property tax paid under protest. In El 
Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp,f 
Utah, 565 P.2d 778, 779 (1977), we said that 
the "common law exception to governmental 
immunity pertaining to equitable claims has 
long been recognized in this jurisdiction." We 
held that neither the passage of time nor the 
enactment of the Governmental Immunity Act 
has eroded that principle. Id. at 780. In 1978, 
the statutory section authorizing the suit in El 
Rancho, see U.C.A., 1953, § 10-7-77, was re-
pealed and such claims are now covered exclu-
sively by the Governmental Immunity Act. See 
Laws of Utah, 1978 ch. 27 § 12. These 
amendments do not undermine the continued 
viability of our holding in El Rancho that equi-
table claims of this nature for assessments 
made "without authority of law," are exempt 
from the notice requirements. El Rancho, at 
780, Because this holding is predicated on the 
common law exception to governmental immu-
iiity for equitable claims, [**28] such claims 
are also exempt from the undertaking require-
ments of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
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V'e also note that Jenkins has requested this 
Coin :o order the Salt Lake County Tax Com-
missi n to create and maintain certain records 
concr-ning private property which is exempt 
from nation. [HN20] U.C.A. 1953, § 59-11-2 
provi <\s ihat "if on examination it is found that 
any c ' i c e r . . . . has neglected or refused to per-
form ay duty relating to revenue, the attorney 
gcner 1 must prosecute the delinquent." Jenkins 
hns : ;!ed to allege any statute or rule which 
ir. :po s upon the tax commission a duty to 
m •;: :n the records in the manner he requests. 
E• v:". tli:re were such a duty, it is the respon-
se il; o! the attorney general to prosecute of-
f cr. Si ) have neglected to maintain records. 
Jr:-s-:; s may of course seek any information 
w.ud is relevant to his property tax claims 
th:\-u \ normal discovery procedures. Any 
d ;pi s concerning the availability and rele-
v iij; )f niis information or the inconvenience 
o uc'iig it in a specific [*1155] fonn 
w HI! * e appropriately addressed to the district 
c< i:; .; usuant to its power to control discov-
er.'. 
II 
.
A
 we noted at the outset, the [**29] coin 
p ' v 11 is case is complicated and confusing. 
P •!" 1 is not clearly identified the specific 
p '"' o vhom his allegations are directed. ?! 
is !;:iate that the defendants did noi iv-
q clarification of the complaint prior \o 
p - Mi::; with the motion to dismiss. We 
h ••:: :empted to organize the issues presented 
o: ;' :al in order to address them. The district 
c< u )i cr of dismissal is reversed insofar as 
ii isscd the causes of action discussed in 
p f his opinion, and affirmed in all other 
r •; c Lb. This case is remanded to the district 
c w f : further proceedings consistent wilii 
tl • ( -: U :-ll. 
v CONCUR: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Jus-
ti v. Hi \ H. Oaks, Justice. 
C •/! BY: WAHLQUIST 
DISSENT BY: WAHLQUIST 
DISSENT 
WAHLQUIS I , District Judge: (Concurring 
and Dissenting.) 
I dissent in part. I concur in the majority 
opinion except in the particular referred to be-
low. 
I have read the plaintiff/appellant's pleading 
and brief and have heard his argument. The 
plaintiff is not a member of the bar. He appears 
pro se. He evidences considerable academic 
training and intellectual control, but does not 
perform in accordance with the customs of the 
bar. He should [**30] not be rewarded with 
undue tolerance at the expense of the defen-
dants for appearing pro se, nor should his 
communications be rejected because they are 
not ordinary in the court setting. What he is 
alleging in layman's terms is surprising, shock-
ing and seems unbelievable; yet, he makes his 
allegations in sober seriousness. 
His allegations, as I understand he intends 
them, are: there is an operating, grand conspir-
acy executed by a large segment of the execu-
tive branch of the government (involved in 
public education) to gain control over certain 
important functions of the legislative branch. 
He has filed one complaint that in pseudo-
legalistic words embraces the breadth of his 
allegations When studied in the context of in-
dependent paragraphs, it appears to be the alle-
gations of totally independent and unrelated 
complaints, but taken as he seems to intend it, it 
is a related allegation. He alleges that the vast 
majority of the state public school teachers and 
many of the administrators are members of a 
group (Utah Education Association) (hereafter 
"UEA"). They are alleged to be united in the 
promotion of their own interests and in the 
shaping of the school system in accordance 
with [**31J their desires. The UEA allegedly 
secures funds from the group that it uses to fi-
Page 15 
<>'/:•> l \A l I M \ ", \K*h \ Utah L h \ l S LItM, ** 
nance the election of favorable legislative can-
didal--s, more particularly, teachers and admin-
istrates. During the legislative term, the UEA 
allegedly compensates the group for legislative 
and personal expenses, even lost wages, if any. 
He claims that the UEA makes it possible for 
the teacher/legislator to draw UEA benefits, 
teach ars1 salaries, and legislators1 compensa-
tion, together with earned retirement benefits 
una:- bo:a the teachers' retirement program and 
the ! :::•:!•: tors1 retirement program simultane-
ous!; iaathermore, all these duplicate wages 
and i one!"its continue, not only during the legis-
h ;\ c te: a, but throughout the year, because of 
cunniiice and legislative hearings. He also 
ahc;,! s ihat their power in the legislature far 
exi.\A !s their number, because they are a highly 
o:; •' ^ ! . unregistered, unrestricted lobby 
g > * w a the power to trade votes. They have 
aco.\ J he floor of the legislature, assured of 
a c ; i > all information in committee meetings 
ant: «• vei; i n caucuses. The plaintiff alleges that 
t! is es :s in innumerable laws not possible 
b «' f r ihis conspiracy. He alleges [**32] in a 
tl .: :K S.s system is now primarily supported 
b a ,,.s provided by the state legislature, as 
o J, fo the general intent that they be lo-
c ( irolled by school boards. He alleges 
thai taxing system for the support of the 
s< -i 1 ;stem results in favored treatment for 
c v a ; a as, e.g., that a property owner of a 
h. T- lo a ted in Emery County [*1156] would 
p y i! me-twentieth of the taxes that a resi 
d a i >alt Lake County would pay for equal 
o -a !' a in a home. He further alleges that 
tl § iture has created a textbook commis-
s \ empowered the state school superin 
h :• I A :o regulate not only public schools but 
a ' ri ate schools, so that the textbooks and 
c T! nl ii are controlled throughout the state 
ii v -cc. conflict with the state constitutional 
P • • . V that state that the legislature will not 
c-..>:. o chool books. He apparently is also 
c va ! that the UEA has formed an alliance 
v a ch groups through parent groups, re-
s•'.a; a legislation and the administration of 
laws to make property tax-exempt on the basis 
that it is worship property or charitable prop-
erty when, in fact, it may be used to promote 
the evangelistic endeavors [**33] of the 
church groups, their mutual welfare funds and 
their general activities involving church schools 
and recreation. He alleges that it is impossible 
for a taxpayer to even discover which proper-
ties are being treated as tax-exempt. He alleges 
that there is no adequate remedy in the system 
because it is extremely unlikely that any mem-
ber of the UEA would bring a suit over a dis-
pute concerning legislative wages or benefits 
and even more unlikely that any school board 
or school system would do so. He further al-
leges that so long as one cannot see these tax-
exempt properties or discover how they are 
treated, a general law suit involving them is not 
likely to reach the courts. He seems to be in 
agreement with the late Martin. Luther King, 
who attempted to bring about social change or 
constitutional rulings by forcing controversies 
into court. ! As a father of school children and a 
taxpayer in Salt Lake County, he presses for a 
judicial determination by paying his taxes un-
der protest. 
1 See Jenkins v.. State, uian, ^8D Jt\zd 
442 (1978); Jenkins v. Bishop, Utah, 589 
P.2d 770 (1980); Jenkins v Finlinson, 
*
J(ah. 607 P.2d 289 (1980). 
[**34] While the plaintiff seems to wel-
come judicial action on any portion of these 
allegations, it would be illogical not to look at 
his general overall allegation for whatever 
merit it might have. It is noted that the same 
general melody of his complaint can be heard 
periodically in the news media in connection 
with legislative and school board elections. In 
view of obvious public interest in the matter, I 
would not dismiss it as a grandiose, paranoic 
delusion. 2 I would return the case to the trial 
court with directions to hold an evidentiary 
hearing to determine to what extent his allega-
tions may be supported by credible evidence; to 
hear what public concerns are present that 
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won! ' Plicate jurisdiction should not be enter-
tain, c : id to direct the trial judge to make a 
di:;*,*!•• li ary finding as to whether this plaintiff 
is e:v li: ! to have the courts entertain jurisdic-
tion on :he basis that he alleges an important 
pt!;-!'c constitutional issue that is not likely to 
rcu!; i IK; courts by any other means and should 
be (!; ;m ined if the separation of powers are to 
be ; T !y maintained. Such a determination 
\v<h; ' vc to be made after paying due respect 
t< i.. c stitutional provisions [**35] that the 
ICJ.IS. ; : will be the judge of its own election 
c ; . YY sies and that broad matters of a politi-
c; uur ,; are best determined in the legislative 
b h i o; government. 
2 It is evident the plaintiff/appellant 
has taken instruction from both Jenkins v. 
State, supra, and Jenkins v. Bishop, su-
pra. He now aims directly at the issues, 
wants an evidentiary hearing and tact 
fully reminds the court that in the past, 
individual justices have agreed and oth-
ers implied that the issue is one of impor-
tance. 
Stewart, Justice, dissents. 
Howe, Justice, does >.\ >• ;\utiun.-'e herein; 
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